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INTRODUCTION
Chapter 2 of de OPTIclf75 Report reviewed the theoreticat reLationships
between changes in exchange rates on the one hand and changes in the [evel of
economic activity on the other. The conclusion  concerning the reaI and monetary
effects of exchange-rate changes in a rer.ativeLy open economy tlas that
"..,  aLl. the schooLs of thought surveyed agree that in !ong-run situations money il.tusion disippears
and exchange-rate changes therefore are not an
instrunent of economic policy with reat effects on
the economy. The essentiat difference among them
on this issue is that white the monetarists believe
that the short run is very short, the other schoots
do not share this vielt ...,t
The first  Report reasoned that in an inftationary environment, where
market participants are tikeLy to form their expecations in futt  awareness of
the impact on domestic costs and prices of exchange-rate adjustments, the period
during which such adjustments have real effects is tikeLy to be short.
The Report uent on to argue for firm management of intra-community exchange
rates and money swpty growth rates. It  atso stressed the desirabiLity of
introducing a European Pafattel Currency (Epc) in competition with nationat
currencies'  The proposed new currency shouLd be made attractive to asset hoLders
by offering partiat protection against inflation.  This was expected to make
its rapid acceptance tikeLy, at teast in the case of the more inflationary
economi es.
The present Report takes up some of the themes of 0pTICA t75.
chapter I  surveys empi'ricat evidence retating to the nominat nature of
the exchange rate :  its tendency over Ionger periods towards conformity with
inftation rate differentiaLs (Purchasing Power parity), the processes by
which this comes about, and especiatLy the experiences of the two member countries
that have inftated and devatued most, namely ltaty and the united K'ingdom.
Its concLusion is that the evidence is targety consistent t.rith the theoreticaI
reLationships between exchange-rate changes and macroeconomic adjustments  set
out in the first  Beport.
.t.?.
In Chapter III  of the present Report s{muLatlon  exper{ments arc'
used to expLone the propertjes of the EPC proposed Last year. These experi-
ments'show that the EPC appears a LittLe Less attractive reLatiVe to seLected
national currenties than was originaLLy envisagecJ; as a consequence the feard
some critics that it  wouLd be so attr'active that it  tiouLd quickLy repLace
nationaL currencies appears unfounded. The concLusion remains that the
Launching of an EPCrapproximateLy in the form discussed in OPTICA'75  and
the present Report, woutd indeed represent a sound approach to the Long-run
monetary unif i cation of Eur.ope.
But in the year that has passed since OPTICAr75 was written,
progress towards European  monetary and economic integration has been bLocked
and, indeed, set back by the persistence of Large discrepancies in rates
of infLation among EC member countries, high leve[s of unempLoyment  and a
success'ion of crises in the exchange markets. The reaction to these crises
has been a reintroduction of foreign exchange controLs and of trade
restrictions of more or Less disguised kinds. These' if  maintained,
threaten to destroy the chance of further progress toward European economic
union.  The concern of pol"icy makers has turned to the dampen'ing of
further centrifugaL tendencies in the exchange markets and it  woutd therefore
appear inadequate to propose as the on[y approach to European monetary
unification the Launching of an EPC, without paying specific attention to
these centrifugaL tendencies. Firmer cooperation  on exchange rates is of
prime importance in the present situation, and a prerequisite for the
eventuat launching of an EPC
This is the background to the proposa[ in Chapter II  for the
management of exchange rates. The evidence of Chapter I  indicates that it
wouLd not 6e ironsistert with [ong-run equiIibrium to limit the movement
of a countryrs exchange rate to the differences  between an average of
recentty observed inftation rates at home and abroad. This is far Less
ambitious than many other schemes that have been proposed in the past.
It gives concreteness to broad ideas that have recentLy been put forward
in officiaL circLes but which wouLd probabLy be inoperative in their
originaL form because they [eave too much discretion to nationaL authorities
in defining exchange-rate targets, At a minimum, the present proposaL
wouLd check the type of positive feedback between exchange markets and
domestic infLation witnessed in 1976" Its objectives are the stabiLisation
of expectations and the reinforcement of the kind of monetary guideLines
which are increasingLy being adopted in Community countries" In this context,
however, it  recoEnises that differences in national inftation rates can be
eLiminated onLy very graduaLLy.
,  t  i'3.
The present recommendation  concerning exchange rates is consistent
with that of 0PTICA'75 concerning the EPC, despite apparent differences
in their respective time perspectives. Furthermore, this Report reiterates
the vieu expressed in 0PTICA '75 that the introduction of an EPC does not
impLy an), particular exchange-rate  regime inside the Community. But it  argues
that it  is difficutt to conceive of progress being made toh,ards an EPC without,
at a minimumrthe sort of exchange-rate cooperation proposed here.4.
CHAPTER  I
0819 r N s A Np . C 0[SE0.U3N-C  E S 0 F*qIC HA NG E- RAT E
CHANGES
ALthough oPTIcA '75 L- 6  -i  referred to  the origins and
consequences of exchange-rate changes in European countnies, it  did not
attenpt to back this up with a systematic survey of relevant erpirical work.
However, since the main issue is cLearLy erpiricaL, it  is necessary to atterpt
such a survey, thus contributing to the aLready considerabte titerature on the
interactions among exchange rates, price and cost Levels and other monetary and
reaI vari abtes.
,  Thjs chapter provides such an assessment in three sections.
1. AnaLysis of the extent to which observed changes in the exchange rates of
Community currencies vis-A-vis each other and outside currencies  may be
attributed to differentiats in nationaL infLation rates
2. Anatysjs of the ways in which changes in the prices of internationalLy traded
goods have worked thei r  way through the cost and price structures of  'EC member
countries.One irportant aspect of this is the effect of tinking various
categories of income to the cost of tiving index, and this is briefLy dealt
with in Annex I-8.
3. Evaluation by means of econometric  modets of how devaluation has worked in
ItaLy and the United Kingdom.
Besides reviewing the pubLished evidence,on these three ctoseLy reLated
subjects, the authors of this report have undertaken  some additionaL  empiricaL
investigation, The resutts of these investigations are in the main text, the
references  and much of the survey materiaL are incorporated in the annexes.
1. Exchange-nate  Chqnge:_as an tdjus.tqett to:2'i.gergent Inf Lation Rates
One naturaL starting assunption, undertying much of tho anaLysis
of European integration and the feasibiIity of economic and monetary union,
is that the marked increase in intra-Community trade and capitaL fLows over
the past 25 years has enforced a high degree of paraLLeLism in national price5.
and cost trends of the member countries,  when measured in a common
num6raire. CLearLy the Iatter quatification has to be added, since intra-
Community  exchange rates have not been exactty stabte in recent years. But
the assumption woutd stitl  be vatid, if  it  turned out that the charqes in
biLateraL nominal exchange rates between Community currencies - or  c hanges
in effective (trade-weighted) terms for each of them -  tended to offset
differentiats between the domestic infIation rate and those in other
Community countries or other trading partners. In other uords, if  the reaI
excharge rate between two currencies, i.e. the nominaL exchange rate corrected
for the infLation differentiaL, is stabte, this may be taken as an indication
of a high degree of integration. simil.arLy, in a system of fixed rates,
it  would be justifiable to regard para[[et cost and price trends, measured
in national currencies, as a sign that integration t"las far advanced.
h,hat is at issue is whether observed exchange..'rate  changes for
Community currencies over the past one or two decades conform to purchasing
Power Parity (PPP). According to a recent survey by L. 0fficer  L- ft_7
the crucia[ issuesi.nvolved in this approach to exchange-rate anatyses are
"'..  (1) that the short-run equitibrium exchange rate is a function of the [ong-run equitibrium exchange rate in the sense that the
former variabLe tends to approach the latter, and (?) that pPp is
either the long-run equiIibrium  exchange rate or the principaL
determinant of it.'r  L'1a, p. 3_7
In the apptfcations of PPP to be reviewed here the inpIicit  assumption
is made that it  is tegitimate ( after three or four years of floating
exchange rates) to regard recentty observed rate constettations as an
approximation to the market-ctearing,  short-run eguiLibria which wouLd tend
to emerge in a system of unmanaged ftoating. Since this assumption'tacks
reaLism, care is requfred in'dre interpretation  of specific cases.
The evidence presented in this section does not cl.aim to test a
theory of exchange-+ate determination. It  has tong been recogniied,.by
proponents of PPP among others, that the causat tinks between differentiat
inflation rates and exchange-rate charges are by no means one-uay, i.e,
only from prices to exchange rates.  Indeed, reasons for betieving the
reverse causation to have been inportant in recent years are discussed
in section 3 of this chapter and forms part of the justification for the
.f.6,
ru[es of exchange-rate  management outtined in Chapter II.  The first  step,
however, is to assess the extent to which movements in reLative infLation
and in exchange rates are correLated with one another.
There are many ways of presenting the evidence on PPP. A fundamentaL
problem is the choice of appropriate price indices to measure reLative
inflation.  There are strong a priori grounds for ranking the possib[e candi-
dates by their degree of conformity to PPP. 0ther probLems are to choose
appropriate base and terminat periods for the data and to determine
whether PPP is more appropriatety observed in biLateraI or in muttiLateraL
currency retationships. It  is not surprising that the many possibte
formutations of PPP have produced a bewitdering maze of resutts some of
which confLict with one another. Given this situation, it  has been necessary
to undertake additionaL caIculations, tailored to the needs of this report
Turning first  to the choice of price indices, there are four main
candidates to be reviewed: export prices, unit Iabour costs, whotesaLe
prices and consumer prices. Sone summary  comments on these data wiLL
be made here whiLst a detailed revieh, of the avaitabte statistical series
may be found in Annex I-A.  A further review is to be found in Officer
- r- la  -I-
.  The cLosest approximation of exchange rates to PPP may be expected
ifPPPiscaLcuLatedonthebasisofexportprices.Indeed,withperfect
competition, a Libera[ trade and payments system and zero transport costs 
i
both prices and exchange rates shouLd tend to adjust in such a llay as to 
i
equaLise price Levets internationally  when measured in a common numdraire. 
;
This equal.ity may be catLed the Lax of one price or absotute PPP- 
I
SpeciaLization, structuraL imperfections  in markets, transport costs and  ;
governmental trade and payments restrictions ril[  cause deviations from 
:
th'is equatity; but to the extent that these various factors are stabLe over  ,
time, changes in export prices -  as generaLly in tradeable goods prices; in
d.ifferentcountriesshou[dstitLbeparatLeLwhenconvertedintoacommon
num6raire. It  is this version of PPP on which we have focussed, as has most
of the empiricaL research avaiLabLe.
There are, however, both conceptuat and statisticaL difficulties in
using export price indices. At the conceptuat  LeveL these prices do not
take into account changes in the profitabiLity of the export industries.
Ifr  for exampte, costs in export industries rise due to an increase
.t.7.
in wages or in imported irputs (e.g. oi[),  profit margins tvitL be squeezed,
provided - as appears reaListic in the case of Community countries lndividua[Ly -
exporters do not aLLour their prices expressed in a common nurneraire to diverge
significantty from those of their cornpetitors.0bservance  of PPP in such a case
couLd not be interpreted at last in the short-term as an equilibrium reLationship;
there wou[d be pressure for the domestic production of trarjeabtes to shnink. At
the statisticaL Leve[, the prob[em is that the avaitabLe series refer to export
industries onty, and that the series are typicaLLy average or unit vaLue indices
(AVX) rather than genuine price indices,
The use of an index of unit Labour costs (ULC) in the tradeabLes
sector remedies some of these defects. By combining information on hourty Hages
and output per man-hou it  wouLd appear that one could obtain more retiabte
information on PPP as an equiLibrium relationship. B-rt here again there are
serious conceptuaL  and statisticaI difficuLties.  IdeaILy, information is
required on totat factor costs and productivity rather than just on one singLe
major factor. But probab[y the poor qua[ity of the avaiLabLe statistics is more
serfous; since indjrect [abour costs such as pay-rotl taxesn unempLoynrent  insu-
rance etc. are large[y excLude6n moreover for two Community countries the reLevant
statistics are not avaiLabLe at aLIrand in four others they are not published
4pt iona I tv. These probLems and the genera[Ly poor erpiricaL resu[ts obtained in testing PPP
with these data tead to the conctusion that unit tabour costs shoutd not be
reLied upon' either in analysing past infLation and exchange-rate behaviour
or in imptementing the proposats for exchange-rate manaEement set out in
. Chapter II.
The third candidate examined is a whoLesale price index (t.lPD, which
ideaL[y measures the prices of tradeabte outputs. It  is preferabte to an
. export price series because it  includes import-competing goods, and it  offers
a stronger test of PPP by givin g gr€ater Height to dqnestic cost etements.
t'lhi Le this index s eems sa t ir factory conce ptula L Ly, it  is not f ree of sta t is t ica L
prob[ems. In particutar ifs coverage  and weighting diffe r substantia LLy between
cot^ntries. Despite these difficuLties and the fact ttp t the conformi ty of
PPP bas.ed upon wPI with market exchanEe rates is sLiglrtLy weaker than that found
for AVX in most of the ca[culations  made for this Report, if  a single inde.x is
to be used in the formulation of PPP the l.lPI is probabty the most appropriate.
.l  n8.
The fourth candidate is the consumer price index (Cpi). This index
includes non-tradeabLe goods and services to a much Largen extent than 14pI
and a formutation  which uses it  shoutd a priori be the least favourable to
PPP. Indeed, there is a substantiaL literature as to why there is LikeLy
to be a "productivity bias" in measuring ppp on the basis of cpl.  rn
particular, Batassa /  a-7 nas argued that the ratio of the price index
for non-tradeabtes to the price index for tradeabLes - the',internal
price ratio" - can be expected to rise with the tevet of productivity
of a country (as measured by reat per capita income or output per man).
If,  indeed, the change over time in the productivity advantage of the richer
country is mainLy concentrated in the production of tradeabtes, measuring
PPP by retative CPIrs which contain a large share of non-tradeables,
xil.L make the currency of the richer country r.ook overvatued.
BaLassars point was originatLy demonstrated for a sampLe of coun-
tries at very different Levels of per capita income. It  is more doubtful
whether this point is important uhen the analysis is focussed on industriaL
countries at approximateLy the same [eve[ of development,  such as member
countries in the community. A thorough empirica[ study recentty done
by offi cer l- 18 -7  casts serious doubt on this, at Least as far as absolute
PPP is concerned. Officerrs findings are however inconcLusive with respect
to reLative PPP. Graph 1 which is taken from a study by ViLtani et aL. shows
L- ?8 -7 a clear positive retationship between the ratio of CpI to WpI and
an index of'productivity. It  is based on cross-section  data for five
Community countries and three non-Community  countries in the decade 1963-72.
It  appears that even in a retativel.y hoirogeneous group of countries the
productivity bias may be sufficientl,y important to cast doubt on the
usefu[ness of testing ppp by means of CpI.
This is important because much ltonk on exchange-rate determination
continues to be formu[ated in terms of cpr.  Thus in a recent major
investigation of reaL exchange-rate variabitity and the impLications for
monetary integration vaubel /  27 -i  concLudes that significant
departures of exchange rates from PPP in the Community between 1959 and 1975
and in the 1970's when a CPI formulation is used, indicate a need for reat
exchange-rate  changes between Community currencies. Vaubetrs argument
that the absence of reat exchange-rate changes is the most appropriate
singLe criterion for evaluating the cohesion of a group of countries and
the feasibitity of their currency unification  may hoLd provided one can iden-
tify  an empiricaL counterpart to his theoneticaL concept of reaL exchange rate.
Indeedwethinkthatthesubstantia[departuresfromPPPwhichhefindsare
probabty more nefLective of productivity bias and differences in the compcsigon  ;
tl  t9.
o o
\9 o s o
*.l o
(h (} \, () s o o r  f ---- I
o
-1-
I
o
o p('
n
I  F+,
F.
o
o i'
'+ OP
Jq
a rl
6p $+ Jd
t-t
&
X
d
!
o
a
F
@ 5
r*tl
c) g
H
tt! lo
lH
tq lr}
lP. lo
Itr
lu, i!r
l}J.
lE
I
Ird lo l.r It
lo to
l5
tIH It
lr+ lo
l3
It$
1u
II'u l|' lP. lo lo
lro
lFr I* iF' lo
i> IF lp
I:r lrt
'o
to
lGr
llJ. l<
I tt'
l3l
l14
\o
o\
I
\o _-l
l\t
uZ'ttOO-OC r  o  out z>
trrrrrlr
c{ lthdQ Cr Fr c, C b ()!6F r'J 't  ts rn }UF}-H}  T E P 5g{:e}"gf4  F
"93;g* s
F
H
F
a
u
o i
):,
o
o
F/.
tJ
8r p
P.
i-
I
t\)
cro,
I
r -o
-H
OP.  P.E |ttr  5 p
*5 to  =| 
| lrx  p rr o  ijo PO  c  I O F|r  FnFt gtp
s)o  otd
F/O  *F otr  tro ur  ryp vF  P.9 bB  trO ts(D  &.r. olt  * o  q,d
OU  O P. F,  O -ct, O t+  c+r< fto  o o  if  l* gta  5 sr\-  p
5Pj  O p3  H
F+r P 8ro &ox O r-l OF prt
I'oo
w *o
-€\ o
fr l-
\r@t" rol \./  Otl  I \t  (,  l@ o@r-o
-tOl \o(rl
r8
I
I
I
la r  Et  l-o ir!  lo co.  I
I
I
t
I
ol txl ro'i'  I sl
I
I
I
t ol
ol
-J^  t otdl  I ov, \otsl \OI
I
I
l"
I
I
.v
Orr
Oc  O-  Od
D
ao -o
oti
7
{x
TI10.
of natjonaI CPI's (see the jnformation on Community
Vaubet himseLf in /-  ?7, p.468-7 and by Vannereau /
exchange-rate  changes.
(1) The Later base peniod was
Communities made avaitabte
on price competitiveness I
CPI I s supp L'ied by
'26 7 than reaL
0n ba[ance then, trPIrs appear to be most appropriate on conceptuat  and
statistica[ grounds for testing PPP; but evidence from tests using AVX and
CPI is presented  be[ow a[ongside those using t^lpl.
A number of possibLe base periods have been considered for the
testing of PPP. The anatysis appears to be fairLy robust to the choice of
base periods between 1959 and 1963, Indeed, betreen the French devatuation
in 1958 and the U.K. devaLuation in 1967, the onLy change in nominal exchange.
rates L/ere the German and Dutch 5 per cent revatuations in earLy 1961. Cost
and price trends measured in nationat currencies lJere not far apart before
1967t the maximum divergence between average annuaL rates of change of
comparabLe  nationat series in the present member countries being of the order
of 1 1/2 percentage points. In a new study undertaken for this report 1961
has been used as a starting point,for bitateral PPP-calcutations  and 1963 for
muLtiLateraI or effective PPP-caLcutationrl).Resutts wiLt atso be presented
for a shorter period, start'ing with'the exchange rates agreed at the Smithsonian
InstiUtbr in December 1971 and average prices and costs for the year betxeen
mid-71 and mi d-72. The Smithsonian rates were intended to be consistent
with Longer-run externaL equiIibrium for the currencies involved and they
shoutd accordingLy  present a more appropriate reference point than, for
exampLerl9TA which was used by the OECD.
The terminaL point for most of the caLculations lras the end of 1975.
It  may be argued that this is inappropriate in view of the dramatic changes
in nominaI exchange rates observed in 1976. Any cu1-off point in a pe|iod
as turbutent as 1975-76 is open to criticism.  For exampLe choosing mid-76
when the inflationary impact of sharp tira and sterLing devaluations  was
being felt  is aLso suspect. Yet it  must be admitted that ending the
observation period at the end of 1975 tends on baLance to put PPP in a
more favourabLe tight than a Later cut-off wouLd have done.
.t.
chosen because the Comm'ission of the European
-in_Septernber 1976 the results of a study
7_t.
i
t
I11.
It  may be argued that pegging some of the Community currencies to
a major currency vioIates the assumption of market-ctearing  exchange rates
which are necessary for PPP to xork. The Luxembourg franc and the lrish
pound are rigidty pegged to, respectively, the Betgian franc and the U.K.
pound; and they have accordingty not been reported in most of the
catcuLations. The existence of fixed margins for cross rates between the
snake - since the departure of the French franc in March 1976 the "mini-snake"-
currencies creates a simiLar probtem for the smaLLer Community currencies  and,
marginaIty so, for the DM. Though the 0ctober 1976 adjustments of exchange
rates jnside the "mini-snake"went some way towards making ttre5e approximate
more cLoseLy to PPP, they wene Less nadicaL than the adjustment that wouLcj
iiavc taken pIace without the intervent'ion ruLes. In thi s resoect at teast
the data do not constitute a fair test of ppp.
There remains the problem of whether to measure PPP bitateraILy or
muttiLateraLLy, i.e. by means of the doub[e-weighted index of inftation
trends in other countries and of effective(trade-weighted)  exchange rates.
A more detaited review of the issues invotved may be found in Annex I-A, The
resutts presented in Graphs ? - 3 are based partLy on bitateral PPP between
Germany and each of six other Community countries, the US, Japan and
Stritzer[and; partly on muttitaterat PPP for a totaI of 18 currencies.
The muLtitateraL framerork is probabty  more important.for it  is in cLoser
correspondence  luith the concept of PPP. But the bilateraI comparisons suppLy
usefuI additionaI information, notabLy in reIation to.the "mini-snake"
currencies for which it  is sensibte to use the DM as a point of reference.
The most striking feature of the evidence is the high degree of
conformity to PPP over 1?61-75'shown in Graph 2 and the undertying regressions
in tabLe 1.  The resutts of this cross-section  study of the DM exchange rates
of nine currencies and the effective rates of eighten currencies are most
strongly in favour of PPP when AVX is used, but onLy sLightLy tess so with WPI,
when tbe CPI and ULC(not reported here)are used the reLationship is much weaker,
The rer"tts in btbre b dd f of Graph 2 are striking; more than gO p"r cent of
the variation in effective exchange rates for the countries studied appears
to be attributab[e to inf[ation differentiaLs. Given the statisticat
imperfectionleven in the best of circumstances,  this is a surprisingty close
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Table 1  :
# Statjstical  Inflatjon Rates and Changes in  Dtvl and Effective
Exchange Rates
- Fesu4s of hss-Sectiqr,-Anqlxses -
fndeperfurt Variable Equation R2
%
a) Inflation differences md ctranges in tl\t exctrange riatesa
1961 -  1975
Crange ln 9lPI
Cfiange in CPI
Change in AVX
Change in WPI
Charge ln CPI
Change ln AV)(
3.468
.975
2.211
.935
2.205
a) NiJ€ ccnrntries
b) 18 cotrrtrles. Effective rates are doubly r,reighted by epor-t, shares.
ldotes: Agn = oonpor:nd annual rate of ctrarrge i.:n ecclrange rateiawpi (acpi,
Aavlc) = eonpotrnd anrrrral rale of ctrange ln whrolesale pries  (conslsrer
. pr5.ces, a\Erage value of elports) relatirre to Cerrnany (D) ard to the
rest of the r,rorld (eff) I nespectivqly; ta = t*value of regrressict
ooefflcienti DW = Itn:tetnJWatssr;  F  = coefficient of determinatior.
An5*=  .O23 + 1.16Oavpi'
Afno*= 1.3O9 +  .498aq>io
arno* E - .182 + 1.o496au5 4,253
b) Inflation dlffgnenes and ct*nges in effectire
ecclrange rates"
At5rr = -
AER-- = - err
1963 -
.437 + 1.
.4O2 +  .
1975
f  8.049
-- 2.968 rI
2,297
1.581
1.759
.632
.120
.721
.802
.355
.807 AEBff = - .245 +  .858Aatgrf 8.176
I
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reLationship.It  underLines  the vjeb,s, expressed aLready in 0PTIs. '75,
that the externat vaLue of a currency is predominantLy a nominaL magnitude,
and conversetyrthat on average since the earLy 1960rs changes in nominat
exchange rates have tended to be atmost entireLV offset, over a nurnber of
years,, by changes in infLation differentiats.
Before offering more detaiLed points of interpretation it  may be
useful to underLine the pol"icy impl.ications of this offset. If  one considers
a country which beLieves that it  can depreciate its reaL exchange rate
by, sayr 10 per cent retative to what wouLd happen under unchanged poLicies
in order to restore external baLance. If  it  attempts to do that by
depreciating its nominaI exchange rate, it  wiLL have to devatue by amuLtipLe
'rl -'/ <l-">, where a is the estimated offset through domestic infLation iduced
by the desired rate adjustment. In the timiting case of conformity to
PPP, the offset is approaching unity and the country cannot durabLy change
its prices.relative to those of other countries. Even when the offset is
significantLy  beLow unity - because conditions are more favourable than
the Longer-run  average situation refLected in the cross-section study -
it  is by no means obvious that the welfare costs of the reaL adjustment
required wouLd be increased if  the adjustment were achieved by methods
other than devaIuation.
Graph 3 shows for the shorter period 1972 to mid-76 how seven
Community currencies  and the US doLLar have conformed to multiLateraL
PPP since the Smithsonian agreement.  Concentrating  on the WPI formuLation,
the conformity to PPP hras close in Germany, France the United States; the
guiLder and particularLy the Danish krone were above PPP, whiLe the
BeLgian franc and Lira, but particutarLy the U.K. pound were below PPP
in mi d-1976.
Additionat  and more detaited evidence may be found in Annex I-4.
One observation that emerges from Graphs 2 and 3 as ueLt as from the
tabLes of Annex 1-A is that conformity to PPP, or at Least parallel
behaviour, is not more evident among the Community currencies  l
than among the wider group
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of industriaL countries. A possible exception 'is the Swiss franc whose
appreciation  above PPP since the Smithsonian agreement is  more pronounced
than for any of the Community currenc'ies. OECD data suggest that Canada
(beLow PPP) and Sweden (above ppp) may be other exampLes of currencies that
lie  outside the range of deviations from PPP spanned by the most deviant
Community currencies. But there is nothing to suggest that the general
concLusion of conformity to PPP is s'ignificantLy  weakened by extending the
gnoup of currencies to incLude most industriaL countries., As is evidenced
by the catcuLations done for the DM on Annex I-A, p.  53.
One imp[ication of this  is that there are no obvious economic
grounds for restricting the proposaL fon exchange-rate  management outLined
in chapter rrronly to community currencies. The generaLity of the concLus4on
that there is a high degree of conformity to PPP is aLso underl'ined by
the fact that PPP appears to work better when formulated muttiIateralLy rather
than biIateraLLy vis-d-vis other Community currencies. This appears to
be the case even for the "mini-snake" currencies, which might have been
expected to aL ign themseLves to Germany. A simi Lar test has not been  . .,.
undertaken systematicaLLy for aLL biLateraL reLationships; but the
relationship is thought to hotd so generaLLy that in the proposat for
exchange-rate  management made in Chapter II,  a spec'iaLl"y  European orienta-  1
tion,  i.e.  Linkage to the DM or to a European unit of Accoun! has been
abandoned as statisticaLLy  unattractive.
FinaLLy, to what extent have infLation trends in unified currency
areas been paraILeL? Departures  from PPP between the various parts of  a
currency area appear to be limited.  vaubeL L- 27_-/ has studied data
fon Germany, rtaly and the united states and found a very much greater
uniformity of prices between regions than between countries.  The
average annuaL infLation rate has been about 1/z percentage  po.int higher.17.
'jn BeLgium and lreland over the past 15 years than in the rest of the
currency aneas of which they form a part: the tll.-EU anci the United K'ingdom
respectivety.  It  may not be far from the mark to suggest that a persistent
annuaL infLation rate differentiaL in terms of CPI of cne perce;ltage po'int
is an approximate upper Limit to what wouLd be feas'ibLe in a Community
currency union. This is not negL"igible  over a run of years, yet it  may
not be enough if  the departures  from PPP by some Community currencies, 
;
cf. Graphs 2 and 3, are'interpreted as indicative of "needed" real
exchange-rate  changes.
It  wouLd be h/rong to draw a firm concLusion that differentiaL
price increases wouId be insufficient since the data are imperfect and
the regression  modeLs Leave some residuaI variation unexpLained.NevertheLess,
some economists wouLcl adniit fn  7  that there may be a residual need for
l_J
reaL exchange-rate  changes in the case of ind'ividuaL Community currencies.
This together with differences in attitude towards infLation, may justify
use of nominaL exchange-rate adjustments.
Furthermore,  no evidence has come to Light, which would show that
adjustment of the norninaL exchange rate is a necessary or even a usefuL
instrument for bringing about changes in the ratio of a countnyrs export
to its import prices (the terms of trade) which is typicaLty  consicJerecJ  as the
aim of an exchange-rate  adjustment. The terms of trade ane in the Long run
determined by reat factors and  are consistent with a  uride range
of nominaL exchange-rate consteLLations.  The main impediments to monetary
unification in the Community are the differences in member countries'
attitudes towards infLat'ion, and the perception that the adjustment  costs
of aLigning nationaL infLation rates on that of the Least infLationary
country are intoLerabty high "in the transitionaL state. These impediments
are a reaLity which any proposal for exchange-rate management has to
keep in mind; they have infLuenced the proposaL in Chapter II.2.
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The concIusions of this first  section are that
(i) observed exchange rate changes in the community have approximateLy
matched inf Iation di fferential.s;
(ii)  approximate  conforrnity to PPp also appears to hoLd for the currencies
of other industriaL countries; it  is not specific to the community;
(iii)  the basis for concLusions (i)  and (ii)  is soundest  when the anaLysis
is based on who[esaIe prices (or export prices), on muLtiraterat
relationships and on tong observation periods.
ttI
rice Mechanisms
To establish a firmer basis for the tentative conctusion that ppp
appLies' it  is necessary to expLore the mechanism which bnings exchange-rate
changes and inftation differentiar.s into approximate equaLity with one another' This requires that the anal.ysis be refined to inc[ude both the direct effects on a countryrs price structure of changes in the pr.ices
of tradeabtes (via the countryrs nominaL exchange rate) and the indirect
effects on infLation through demand effects.  The present section Looks at some evidence on the direct effects on domestic costs and prices of
externaLty generated price increases without taking into account the
effects through higher demand. Despite its partiaL nature such an
analysis seems useful; the direct price effects act quickLy and put a Lower Limit
on the size of dre adjustment between inftation diffenentiaIs  and nominaL
exchange-rate  changes.
The retevant fnamework for ana[ysis is input-output tabLes. These
show how an X per cent increase in the prices of tradeables measured in
domestic currency - due to an increase in tradeabLes prices measured in a
num6raire or to a devaluation of the domestic currency - works its way through the economy- The consequences  are shown for the domestic prices of non_ tradeabtes' the profits of the sectors producing tradeabLes argthe other cost and price variabLes which determine whether the initiaI  impuLse Leaves any reaL effects.-**-.*.-...".....".........#
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A recent paper by de 6rauwe and Holvoet /- 1O-7Oist'inguishes between e6rs
producing  tradeabLes, i.e.  subject to internatjonaL competition' and sectors
producing non-tradeabLes, i.e.  sheLtered from internationaL competition' 
-  -
The distinction largeLy foLlows a cLassification suggested by van Poeck L 25-l
on the basis of pri cing behaviour in the Betgian economy. It  suggests tl"rat
the share of traded goods in total consumption is cLose to one third; and
that traded goods' share of totaL production is 40 to 50
per cent. There are onLy smaLL differences between the six economies in
these respects -  and no observabLe tendency for the two smaLter economies
to be more or.iented towards consuming and/or producing traded goods, than the
four Large economies. tl,hiLe this apparent uniformity may to some extent be
due to the uniform cLassification  which was imposed, it  nevertheLess
throws serious doubt on the assumption often made; that considerabLe
differences in size between countries make' a paraLLeL reaction to externaLLy
generated inf tation unLikeLY.
The resutts obtained by de Grauwe and Holvoet are sumrnarized in TabLe
which shows the effect of a one per cent devaLuation  Of the effective
exchange rate of the domestic currency on consumer prices (CPI), the ratio
of traded to non-traded goods prices GT /  P*) and the profit  margin (S/T)in
the traded goods sector.  Two figures are shown for each entry; the
first  disregards wage indexing on the CPI, whiLe the second assumes  h'ages
to be fully'indexed in percentage terms without delay to the CPI'  (These
two cases mjght be LabeLLed compLete and no money jLLusion, respectiveLy)'(,v.
TABLE  2
Bel,9i rii
Fran ce
Germany
Ita Iy
Nether Iands
Unfted Klngdom
on
CPI
0.47
(0.64)
0.45
(n. a. )
0.53
(0.7CI)
0.45
(0.62)
0.50
(0.71 )
4,47
(0.66)
on
PrlPn.,
0.75
(0.51)
0.81
(n.a, )
0.73
(0.46)
0.80
(0.56)
0.75
(0.44)
0.76
(0.49t
on
)rT
_-,!.-
0.32
(0.20)
0.16
(n,a. )
0.43
c0.?7,
4.46
( 0. 30)
0.31
(0.19)
0.40
(0.??>
The impact of a devaluation is to push up consLmer prices by one haLf to
two thirds of the devaluation percentage depending on the degree of indexation; to increase traded goods prfces reLative to non-tnaded goods prices by three- fourths of the devatuation percentage ,  decLining to one hal"f in the case of fuLL indexation; and to increase profft margins in the traded goods sector by 50-45 per cent of the devaLuation  percentage, decLinlng to 20-30 pen cent under fulL in- dexation' In aLI cases the intra-country differences are modest, though there is a tendency for the shift in the income distribution towards profits to be at a
minimum fn the two smaILest economies, Betgium and the Nethertands.21.
1o.1hiLe the resuLts are obviousLy mechanicaL and much in need of further
anaLysis, they Lead to two important conclusions which are :
(1)  The direct transnission of the effects of devaLuation to domestic
pnices is strong, even without indexation. Keep'ing in mind that
the impact is typicaL[y compounded by factors negLected in the simpLe
input-output framework, the resu[ts underLine the difficulties of
infLuencing reat factors -  reLative prices and the income distribution -
even in the short run through nominaL changes; this emerges most
cLear ly in the results f or the prof j t marg'in'
(2) The effect of indexation, though important, is not as decisive as
might have been expected.  ALL countries find themseLves in the
intervaL between the figures indicated in each coLumn of Table 2,
whether they have formaL indexation clauses in wage and saLary
agreements or not since observed and expected increases in the CPI
are an important determinant of wage and saLary increases-
In view of the timeLess nature of the resuLts presented in Tab[e 2n the
concLusions  shouLd not be overstated. The caLcuLations  show the totaL effects on
prices and incomes, but convey no'information as to the speed of the transmission'
CLearLy, the degree of automatic indexation is one important determinant of this
speed. The EC Commission has made avaiLable some materiaL on the methods of wage
indexation currentLy in use in mernber countries and on possibLe modifications to male
these methods more flexible /  8 -7.Some of this  information is set out in Annex 1-B'
as it  cannot be discussed in detaiL here. But, it  brings out three interesting 
,
,concLusions (1) there has been a tendency in most countries for the intervaL to 
I
be shortened between cpr increases ancj the release of the consequent aILowances.
This tendency, most cLearLy in evidence 'in btgium and ItaLy' has speeded up the
tnansmissionofinfLationI?)Itisnotaprior.iobviousthatformaLindexation
enSuresastrongertransmissionofexternaLinfLationithesurVeyshows1asmany
observers have aLready notedrthat there is no correLation  between the infLation
rate of individual couhtries and the degree of formaL indexation- NotabLy, the two
countrieswiththehighestinfLationrate-Ita|yandtheUnitedKingdom-have
in the past used indexation f.ar Less extensiveLy thanrsay/ tieLg'ium or Denmark.
(3) In no country has it  proved oossible to cJevise qenerat[y aCceltahLe
methods for  remov'ing from the index usedrdeteriorations in the terms
of trade in the form of strongLy ris'ing import prices. Though intensive
efforts were depLoyed in this direction foLLowing the increase in the
internationaL price of oiL in earLy 1974, wage and saLary inderxation
continues to be of a comprehensive and automatic kind2?.
It  woutd have been desirable to supptement the comparative  analysis
of db Grauwe and Hotvoet by more detaited work on individual countries. In
any case a review has been undertaken of existing work on the internationaL
transmission of infIation in three of the smalIer community countries and for
Gerfi')any L 9111r12114r21r??rz{,nost  dthis  Literature is based on nationaL input-our-
Pt tabLes'Itdemonstrates broadly the appticabiLity in the short run of the
so-caLLed scandinavian modeI of inftation.  This modeL, devetopped  by Norwegian
and swedish authors in the [ates 1960's, accepts the assumption that ppp applies
to traded goods prices, and focusses attention on the mechanism whereby infLatio-
nary'impuLses  spread to non-tradeabtes through the tendency towards equaLization
of wage increases in the two sectors. The modeI envisages a greaten infIationary
impulse than has been considered here for it  assumes that !/age earners in the
traded goods sector succeed in raising their L/ages in l"ine, with t5e (hi6h)
oncductivit;, increases in tiris sector.
To the extent that wage earners in the traded goods sector prevent
the limited shift towards profits shown in Table 2 and wage earners in the
non-traded goods sector succeed in keeping their nominaL pay increases in step
with the pay of their coL[eagues,  the transmission of an externaL infLat.ionary
impuLse, e.g, a devaLuation,  may eventuatl.y raise the cpr by more than the originaL
percentage deva[uation- If  output per man rises more slowl.y.in the non-traded
goods sector, a panalte[ increase in wages in the two sectors wiLt ra.ise the
internaL price ratio (PrulPr) and the cPI which is an average of the two output
prices wiIL tend to rise faster than pr.
|/hi[e it  is possibLe for such processes to occur, they go beyond
the confines of a pure[y suppLy, or input-output orientated modet. If  applied
over Longer periods the scandinavian modet impLies that demand adjusts passivety
through an accommodating  economic, part icuLarIy moneta ?y t  got .i cy.
AsBransonandMyhrmanL-4-.iamongstothershavepointedout,a!atisfactory
anaLysis of infLatfon requires a modet combining demand and supp[y factors,
particularLy for the Longer-run adjustments which are the main concern of this 
]
Report' Part[y fon this reason/ partLy because of the difficulties of presenting
the various nationaL studies which are of a largety supply-oriented nature
in a comparabLe way, this Report concentrates on the experience of the two
countries that have inftated and devaLued the most.23"
Case 3. The Ef f ect j veness of Exchryrge-Rg.lg- Cha es in EEC Countries  2
Studies of the U.K. and ItaLY
3.1.  Purpose and MethodoLogY
The main aim of section 3  is to estabLish whether exchange-
rate changes are effective in the t!,lo countries unCer review and in particu-
LEr to throw Light on
(a)  the short, CIedium and Longer-run effects of exchange-rate
changes on a countryrs externaL account;
(b)  the "New Cambridge Schoo[" assertion that the effectiveness of
exchange-rate changes on the current account depends upon a
sustained change in the size of the govennment sector budget
rather than di re ct ty on the ex change- rate change i t seLf;
(c)  the "monetarist" assertion that, in the Long run, exchange-rate
changes have no sustained effect other than on nominaL variabLes-
The methodotogy of this section is based on the use of macro-
econometrjc modeIs. For the U.K. studies aLready avaiLabte were drawn upon,
for ltaLy d'irect access was obtained to the modeL developed at the
UniversitA cji BoLogna L' 24 -7 
-
The Limitations of econometric  models are many and some of them
are welL-known. The essentiaL one to be emphasized here is that modeLs cannot
neveaI more than is buitt into their structure. Thus they cannot prove or
disprove an hypothesis unless their structure is buiLt according to the
theory to be tested. ConseguentLyrnone of the models referred to here are
abLe to test the "monetarist" theory of devaluation  because,,among other
reasons, they do not treat the money supp[y as endogenous under fixed
exchange rates.
3.2.  U.K. Studies
Three recent studies on the U.K. are anatysed here. The first
one is partiaL equiLibrium in character, whereas the other two focus on a
generaL equitibriLrn anaLysis of the effects of exchange*rate  changes.?4.
.3.3. The First U.K. Studv
The study by Artus f  1J  is partiaL equ'ilibrium in character
since devaluation is taken to have no effect on the Level of aggregate  demand,
and hence national product. This feature foLLows from the assumption that
the change in the exchange rate is accompanied  by appropriate  aggregare
demand management poLicies which leave aggregate  demand unchangecl.  As a
consequence, the internaI inftation generated by devaLuation is onLy the
result of the higher price of imports and exports and their subsequent impact
on hrages and prices. InfLation, indeed, isnot the most suitab[e wond to
describe such a process which represents a change in the relative price of
imports and exports, and of traded vs. non-tnaded goods. Devatuation, in
this study, plays onLy a role of ttexpenditure switching',, whi Le it  is
assuned that "expenditure reducing" is obtained through an active poticy of
demand management. The analysis therefore foltows the traditional,,eLast.icity
approach", rather than the f'absorptfon approach',. Because of these Iimi-
tations, the study by Artus can only partiatLy contribute to the anaLysis of
the three points enumerated above. Nevertheless, its main objective, the
anatysis of the effectiveness of the November r  1967 sterLing devaluation
is caref uL Ly done rn the present section the review of Artusts many f .inclings
is confined to two effects of tire devaLuation: first  on the int€rnaL waEe
and pri ce structure'  and then on the cur.rent accoui'rt of the batance of
payment s.
(a)  Ef fects on the hlage and pri ce Strllcture
These effects bear directLy on the
the "monetarist,, assertion that,
have onLy nominal effects.
questions raised in point3.1(c)above :
in the Long run, exchange-rate  charrges
In November 1967 ster[ing was devat.ued by 14.3 % wf th respect to the
dot[ar- However, since this devaLuation llas accompanied by  changes in
some other currenciesr exchange rates, Artus computes an effective devaIua-
tion which is equaI to 13.9 %. Because of the assumption of a constant fulL-
empLoyntent output.Artusrs  estimate of the increase in the wage Leve[ is based
exclusively on devaLuation induced suppIy forces/. nameLy the increase in
the prices of imported materiaLs and foodstuffs; the consequent increase in
the cost of Living and hence the effects on price expectations and, uLtimate-
Ly, wages. The cumuLative finaI outcome from 1968-19T1 is an increase
in wages of 6.8 % which represents 48.9 % of the effective devaluation  and
ofconsumer prices of  5-6 % rhich represents 40.3 % of the devaLuation.25.
Artus aIso computes the time pattern of this reaction. During
the f irst  two years after the deva Luation ( | 68 and | 69)r.t-ne UK incoi'res
poLicY meant tirat wages r,Jere not aLLoued to respond to the cievaLuation,
whi Le pri ces neacted onLy sLot^rly. It  raas onLy by the end of the f ourtlr
year (1971) that the fulL effects were feLt.
(b) Effects on Traded Goodsr Prices and on the Current Account
The prices of products competing with imports rose eventuaLLy up to
13.1 I  in the case of semi-manufactured  products (94 % of devaLuation)  and
by at Least 4.0 7, for foodstuf f s Qq I  of devaLuation). The export pri ces
of goods and services rose/ in sterLing, by an average of 10.31 (747' of
devaLuation). The terms of trade (ratio  of export to import prices) feLL
by - 1.9'1.  Since the change in the prices of non-traded goods due to de-
vatuation is estimated by Artus to be [ow, devaLuation h,as found to have
a switching effect partLy through the substitution of non-traded for traded
goods in domestic demand 6nd vice-versa 'in domestic production)' but even
more through the substitution of real exports for reaL imports- The net
resuLt on the current account was substantiaL  and remarkabLe in its time
pattern. By 1971, onty three years after devaLuationrthe  trade baLance had
improved by L 709 miLlion, equal to 1"7 /, of 1971ts GDP. The corresponding 
,
finaL improvement in the current account was L 996 milLion, and by 1970 it
had again aLready overshot that figure, and was equaL to 2.4 7. of GDP-
Even though devaLuation initiated a substantiat and fast improvernent
of both trade and current account, the initial  effect on the trade batance
was perverse. In other words, the existence of Low short-run e[asticities
gave rise to the J-curve effect.  During the finst ha[f of 1968 the trade
account deteriorated by b 134 miLLion (annuaL rate), but this was more than
compensated by the improvement in the second haLf of the year (+ t  140 miLtion
at annual rates). Thus the J-curve eff ect was 'important but it  onLy Lasted
s'ix months and there t"ras a curnuLative net surp [us t,ithin a year-
Artus concludes that the 1967 devaLuation of the pound had positive
effects on the current account of the baLance of payments, which "occurred
refativeLy rapidLy and were Large 'in their magnitud"" /- 1 " p.59!7.It shouLd
be underIined,  however, that these positive effects depended on the off-
setting nature of the accompanying  demand management poLicies and poL'icies on
incornes, rent controLs and administered prices, which sLowed down the
./ ,.?6.
transmission of inflationary effects onto the wage-price spirat.
3.4.  The Second U.K.-Studv
Burns and t'Jarburton f  5-7 examine the operations of a Nordi c in-
f[ation modeL with monetarist features using quarterLy data for 1961-1975.
They prefaced their discussion with an argument that the varying importance
of imperfections  in domestic markets for manufactured goods and for food
and minerals (coupLed with imposed imperfections  such as prices and incomes
poIicies) wit'I cause substantiat but variabLe Lags in the adjustment of
domestic prices to worLd prices. rf this is true, ppp wiLl not hold in the
short run though it  may eventua[|.y dominate. rn such circemstances,  exchange
rate. adjustments in a fixed exchange rate system, especiaILy if  neinforced by
"pay pause poLicies", ffscat drag and an infLation-eroded subsidy system,
may lJetL act as a usefuL short-run poLicy instrument for tackling externaI
disequiIibriun.  Domestic export-and-import-competing  goods wilt be reLative.
Ly cheap and infLation wiLL erode the wage rate.  Exchange-rate  i[[usion,
measured by the existence of a differentiaL between the domestic and the
internationaI  purchasing power of a unit of domestic currency, witL exert an
infLuence on the externaL sectorfs trade position either thnough the
Keynesian substitution effects, as argued by Artus, or perhaps through the
monetari stsr own transmi ssion mechanism.
0n the basf s of this mode[, Burns and t^Jarburton obtained corroborating
evidence that there was a substantiaL lag before U.K. prices adjusted to
worLd prices and changes Jn the exchange rate;  that the leveL of unemptoy-
ment infLuenced the speed of adjustment; and that the imposition of an in_
comes policy also dayed a significant roLe. rn addition devaLuation had an
impact on income distribution fn that earnings in the manufacturing  sector
rose reLative to totaL disposabte  incomets share of GDp. However, once these
Lagged inf[uences of past worLd price teveLs or exchange-rate  changes had
been futly workecl out, their effects on domestic factor end product prices
were not substantiaL.
A rise in worl.d prices by 1z would induce after a year and a half a
1'05 % rise in the price of u-K. manufactured goods; the Lofig-v.g6 eLasticity
of u'K' manufactured goods prices to changes botlr in worLd prices and exchange
rates ldererrespectiveLyrl.0s  and o.863.consumer prices, ulhoLesaLe prices and27.
earnings were aLso closely tied to previous worLd price LeveLs or exchange-
rate changes after an adj ustment period of four years'
unLike Artusts findjngs, which were that, though pervasive, movements
in worLd price LeveLs did not eventuaLLy infLuence U.K' prices to such an
extent that the competitiveness gained by devaLuatjon t.las eventuaLLy eroded,
Burns and li,larburton concLude that in the Long run thejr estimates provide
evidence which is consistent with the Nordic infLation modeL' I'The Long
run effect of worLd pnice changes and exchange rate changes appear forcibLy
and repeatedLy at the LeveL of export prices, whoLesaLe prices, earnirrgs and
by imp li cation consumer pri ces" L' 5, p.9-7.In the Long run, as def ined above,
the exchange-rate iLLusion wiLL not exist as there wiLL be no gap betureen
the internaI and the externaL purchasing pobJer of the currency. Any per-
manent gain of exchange-rate  depreciation in terms of the externat position
must be induced by another channet -  the infLation reduced real purchasing
power of non index-linked government transfer payments which Leads to a
"permanent"  reduction in reaL domestic expenditure relative to reaL GDP'
3. 5.  rhe 1l!rd_U_,.5::9Ludv
The study by Ba L L, Eurns and Laury /3 -7 is  capable of thr^o'"ring mone Light
on the questions raised in Section 1, than the partiaL equjL'ibriun anaLysis
employed  by Artus.  It  uses the London Business SchooL (LBS) modeL, which in
1975 uas not a compteteLy generaL equilibrium modeln but which at  Least
treated the government budget as Largely endogepous.  The rnodeL treats rnonetary
pol.icy expLic'itLy, even though at the time of this  exercise it  d'ici not
eJcaL satisf actor.iLy with the f Low of funds between tire baLance of payi'nents'
the government budget and the baLance sheets of the banking and private
sectors. Thus, the model was not abte to satisfy aLL the theoreticaL re-
quirements for testing either the monetarist or the portfoLio approach to
the baLance of payments. Even soo it  does throw some Light on the "New
Cambridge SchooLrtapproach, at  Least in its  simpLe formuLation wh'ich, as was
seen in  opTrcA t75, is akin to the absorption approach to the baLance of
paymentS.
Various simuLations wene performed on the LBS model, covering the
perjod frorn the first  quarten of 1975 to the first  quarter of 1980' They are
based on the effects of a notionaL 20 % devaluation of the pound.?8.
(a)  DgvaLuatjon and the Time_ p"ttern of the current Account
Two simuLations are particu[arIy'important  for anaLysing thjs effect.
Sfmu[ation I  (cf. Graph 4) evaLuates the impact of a change in the exchange
rate with alI tax and benefit rates unchanged. The current account shows
a famiIiar J-curve patternl) The deterioration of the current account Lasts
five quarters and has onty been reabsorbed by the tenth quarter though by
the end of the period its  improvementreLative  to the controL S.imuLation
corresponds to 0.7 % of GDP.
In SimuLation II,  government current expenditure is varied so as to
maintain output at the controL tevel. Thfs is done so as to isoLate the
resource transfer effect from the total output effect of the exchange rate
change. Thus, this Simutation is c[ose to the exercise contained in Artusrs
study- The Long-run resuLts are not substantiaILy different from those of
SimuLation I,  however, the magnitude of the improvement in the current account
is marked[y affected i,n the middLe periods. By quarter 1a (z 1lz year{,
the improvement in the current account as compareci I'lith  Sir;uLation I,
roughLy ,loubLed. rlowever, by 1980 A IV it  i s 24 % beLou that of the unconstrai'
riecl change reached in SimuLation I.  The behaviour of prices anci earnings is
boradLy s'imiLar as between the simuLations, though the rise in consumer  and
export prices and wages and saLaries is at first  more accentuated in
Sirnulation LI as cornpared to SimuLation  I
(b) The Current Account and Budge.tary PoLicy
oot,,, as discussed in opTrcA ,75,
is that a persistent change in the current account can be obtained only
through a persistent change in the government  sector budget. To test this
hypothesis, the effects of a 20 % devaLuation  wene simuLated subject to a
constraint which restrained the government deficit to the controL sotution
from period 9 onwards ( $imulation IV, cf. 6raph 5).  The resuLt is that, wh.iLe
in Simulation I the impnovement in the current account t,las accompanfed by a
simiLar improvement in the government deficit,  in  simu[atfon IV the current
account remains a[most identicaL to that of the controL sotution. As the
)  t'In the initiaL quarters the current account deteriorates as the lag .in the response f the voLume of exports means that h'igher import pri ces are not of f sei by h.igher ex- ort earnings- FoLLowing the improvement in export votume the current account im- roves and remains in surpLus throughout the simuLation period. However, by the end of he period th'is cannot be attributed to the impact of th'e re[ative pri ce change because
"')  by the end of 24 quarters the 20 Z devaLuation has Led to export and import rices rising by the fuLL extent of the exchange rate change whi[st earnings, consLmer rices and the 6DP deflator are up between 1s % and 19 % C.,.1 The surptui is the ne- uLt of the squeeze on reaL incomes brought about by the higherratio of taxes to in-
cme relative to the control and the Lower reat vaLue of government grants.,,/-3- i'o 6  trs ,Fa  tr  '"t +)lprj n({
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authors say, r'it  foLLows quite cleanLy from a comparison of Simulations I
and IV (...)  that, to provide even a temporany  improvement in the current
account of the balance of payments foLlowing a devaLuation/ the governmentrs
financiaI deficit in the Long run must adjust by appnoximateLy the same
amount. If  the authorities (as in the case of Simutation IV) do not permit
this adjustment jn the governmentfs financiat deficit to take pLace (or do not
ensure that it  does) then apart from a transitory effect on totaL output the
Lorg-run effect of the change in the exchange rate wiLL simp[y be to raise the
domestic price Level to a new long-term tevel" I  S7
For our purposes, the majn conclusjons that
study by BaLL and others, are that :
are  drawn from the U.K.
(i)  The domestic nate of infLation tends to adjust to the external rate,
and in the Long run compLeteLyoffsetsthe  reLative price effects of de-
vaLuatfon (cf. 6raph 6).  As the authors say "aLthough the mechanism is
different (...)  the modeL is consistent with the proposition made by
those using a monetary  approa ch" /-3 j
(ii)  "The pubLic sector deficit and the current account deficit tend
to move together... This supports one of the major concLusions of the
"New Cambridge  SchooLr', aLthough in this case there is no question of
causaLity flowing from the pubIic sector to the overseas sector" /37
(iii)  "The output effect of the singLe exchange-rate change is effect.ivdy
transitory since the competitive advantage is subsequentIy wiped out
by the adjustment of incomes to import prices restoring domestic costs
to previous LeveLs" [Zi  Thus "the exchange rate cannot be re-
garded as it  has been in the past as an instrument of economic policy.
0n the contra ?y, it  should be seen as a symptorn of the behaviour o'f
f iscaL and monetary poLicy" /3]I
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3.6.  flg-ti,an.sLudy
The ltatian modeL used for this exercise is the one developed at
the Universit} di Bo[ogna, in connection with Project LINK. It  is veny
sirniLar in form to the U.K. modets, but is somewhat less compLete on the
monetary side. Thus, as jn the U.K. modeLs, it  is not able to test fairLy
the monetarist approach to the baLance of payments.  Moreover, even for the
simpLe version of the "portfoLio approach", the 'tNew Cambridge SchooL"
pos'ition, the ItaLian modeL is not compLeteLy satisfactory, since the govern-
ment sector is Largely exoEenous to the modeL, and its financing does not
feed back into the monetary variables of the modeL. Thus, tooseLy speaking,
the ItaIian modeL stands between the modeL used by Artus and the LBS modet.
Effects on .the Current Account
Two basic experiments  were performed using the ItaLian modeL.
They give a first  idea how over tjme the current account responds to de-
va Luation.
The first  is a  historicat simuLation over the period 1963-68.
It  was assumed that the 1963 baLance of payments crisis in ltaLy resuLted in
a devaluation rather than the maintenance of a fixed exchange .rt"(1). In
order to have comparabiLity with the LBS study which is concerned onLy with
forecasts rather than historicaL simulations, the Lira was notionaLLy  cle-
vaLued by 20 Z at the beginning of the period (1963.1) and the effects were
traced, particularLy on the current account, throughout the fo[|.owing six
yearsz eUdrter by quarter.
The second basic exercise is an aLternative fonecast for the
six years 1975-80. A comparison is made between a "probab[e" soLution (in
which the Lira is devaLued to take account of what has aLready happened in
1975-76 and the further devaluation which may weLL take pLace up to 1980)
reLative to a "controL"soLution in which the tira rate is kept constant at
its average 1975 LeveL vis-i-vis the doLtar,
@mayappearunLikeLyinretroSpectinviewofthe.-/...
short-term nature of the externaL crisis.  FoL Lowing the t'ightn'in$' '"
of fiscal and monetary policies jn the second half of 1963, the current
account improved rap'idLy in 1964; and it  remained in surpLus in the
1965-68 period. A Lire devaLuation in 1963 shouLd therefore be regarded
as iILustrative only and not as a reaListic aLternative  poL'icy.34.
(a)  Effecls of a 20 z Devalqation of the Lira at the Besinning of qbe
Period 1963 -  1968
EJfgglS-gn-jnpeflS.  In the first  year after the devaLuation there is
a fall  in physical votr,rne of imponts by 2 - 5 % due to the switch from
higher priced imports to their domestic substitutes. This switching effect
is reduced by internat inftation generated by the same devaIuation whilst
in addition the expansionary  effect of devaluation on reaL income (which,
as l''le shaLI see, is dominant during the second year) expands the demand
for imports. Thus, overaIt, the physicat volume of imports decreases
by much [ess in the second year relative to the controL soLutjon (- O.9 n)
and actualLy rises in the third year (+ a.6%>. In the tong run (as wiLL
be seen in greater detaiL Later on) the modeL does not generate an internaL
infLation capabIe of eLiminating  ccrnpLeteIy the originaI price advantage
which the 20 % devaLuation gave to dornestic products nelative to imports.
Thus, in the tong run, the physicat vo[ume of imports stays at a lower
Level relative to the controL sotution (about -  3 % by the fifth  and
sixth year).
The vaLue of imports, expressed in lire,  increases frorn the beginning
and throughout the period, reaching a peak of aLmost 20% above control
during the third year and slowing down, for the reasons aLready exp[ained,
to a di f f erence of 15 .4 'l in 1968.
EJj9slS-g!-elggtls.  During the finst tllo years there is an increase
in the physicaL voIume of exports reLative to the controL soLution because
of the price advantage aItowed by devaruation,  which reaches a peak of
aLmost 5'/ in the second year. In the mediwn run the improvement is partLy
reduced by internal infLation which aLso pushes up the ItaLian export price.
NevertheLess,  even in the Long run (contrary to the,,monetarist,  expecta-
tion) internaL inf[ation does not erode the whole competitive advantage,
and the vo[urne of exports in the sixth year (1968) stays at 2.9 % above
cont ro L.
The va[ue of exports, in lire,  increases by up to 20.6 % relative to
controL at the end of the second year, and in the Long run stays approximateLy
2A/, above control. However, this 20 Z long-run increase is not pureLy35.
a nominaL effect of a 20'l devaLuation  (as in a monetarist modeL),
but is the net result of a persistent real increase in exports (of
about 3 D pLus an increase in the [ire price of exports, whjch is
correspondingly  Lower than the rate of devaLuation.
Ngg-elfe-g!S-en-!hg--g.Ut.Cg!l-A-g-gggn!  (See Graph 7)  As a resuLt of alL
these effects on imponts and exports, the baLance on current account shows
the fami Ijar J-curve pattern i  an 'initjaL deterioratjon before it  improves.
When measured in Lire, the deterioration reaches a maximun during the fjrst
quarter and [asts for three quarters. The deterioration of the current
account during the first  year is not offset by the improvement in the
foLLowing year. Moreover, there is only a modest improvement in the medium
term (third and fourth year); it  is onLy in the long run (fifth  and sixth
year) that this becomes substantiaL.  The reasons for this long-run be-
haviour, as lle shaLl see laten on, are essentiaL[y Linked to the incomp[ete
transm'ission of infLation into the economy following the 2O % devaLuation.
(b)  Effects of the DevaLuation fnom 1975 -  i9BA
This exercise is not reaLLy comparable to the preceding one, nor
to those performed by BaLL and others over the same period for the U.K.
The "control" soLution here is one in which the exchange rate is kept
constant at approximateLy its  1975 averaEe. 0n the other hand, when devaLua-
tion is sir,uIatedrthe effect'ive exchange rate is nct changed ry a one-step 70'lras
in the 1963-68 exercise or in the study by BaLL and others but rather :+i
Lowereci gradua L [y according to the f orecasts of the BoLogna modeL. Thus,
neithen the tim'ing nor the amount are comparable to those'in the two
other exercises. In particular, the rate is devaLued relative to controL
by about 47 % by the end of the period, and this happens mainLy in the
second (1976) and t hi rd year (977> .
EJISStS-g!-l[pg-fJ.:. The physi ca I volume of imports decreases sub-
stantiaL Ly in the years when devaLuation exerts its maximum impact 06  z
- 5.4 %; 77 z  - 4.7 7);  but by the end of the period it  reaches its
initial  tevel. This is contrary to the preceding exercise, where  a
permanent decrease in physicaL terms was obtained. NevertheLess, the
behaviour of both neal national product and consumersr  non-durabLes  ex-
penditure are simi Lar by the end of the period. The evidence. suggests\o
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that thjs result is not due to an absorption effect Lower than the one
in the previous exercise, but to a lower expenditure switching effect,
i.e. a rnore cornpLete transnt'ission of devaLuation into inf Lation'
EJJgSt:-g!-gIggIt!.  There is an inrease in the phvsicaL voLume of
exports, particuLarLy in the first  few years foLLowing devaLuation. But
this increase is not maintained in the Long run (+ 0.727, in 1980). Due
to a higher transmission of infLation in this exercise than in the pre-
vjous one (when even in the Long run the effect was a sustained higher Level
of reaL exports :  + 2.9 % in 196il. Indeed, whjLe at the end of the
period the export price of Itatian products had risen (in Lire) by onLy
82.5 % of deval.uation in the previous exercise, it  now rises by 99.7 %
ofdevaLuation.ThusPPPappearstoappLywithincreasingandconsiderabLe
preci sion to Ita L'ian export pri ces.
!91_EjJ9-g1:_9!-!!g-9gf:S*-lgsggl!.  since deva Iuation does not occur
in one step, the time profiLe of the current account cannot be compared uith
the previous Italian exercise, nor with the resuLts of the U.K. modeL.
Nevertheless,  a deterioration preceding the improvement as weLI as a sub-
stantjal improvement by the end of the period can be observed here too.
But, contrary to the preceding ItaIian exercise, this Long-run improvement
is below the peak improvement, which occurs in 1978.
The effectiveness of devatuation can be measured to some extent by
the fact that after six years the current account shows an eLasticity of
0.1? to devaLuation, i.e. for every percentage point change in the exchange
rate, the current account improves by 0.12 % of the end of period current
vaLue of imports plus exports. This elast'icity was much higher for the
1963-68 period, nameIy 0.68. (If  we take beginning of period rather than end
of period values of totaL trade, we have the foL[owing elasticities:
1.21 tor 63-68, and 0.22 for 75-80 )1 Thus the Long-run elasticity of the
cunrent account to devaLuation has been peduced to about one si:<th frorn
63-68 to 75-80 (and for a greater amount of devaluation). t{hiLe it  has not
been reduced to zero, as the "monetarist'r theory t"louLd maintain, these re-
suLts seem to suggest that "exchange-rate iLLusion" is smaIter now than38.
10 years ago, and that it  is  inverseLy correlated to the degree of
devaLuation.
The Current Account and Budgetary poLicy
The resuLts of the U.K. study for the 1975'BO pc.rioC,rvere consistent with
tire"ilew cambriclSe  SchooL"approachreven though the effect of devaLuation in th*
study operates through the defLationary infLuence that the infLation it
produces has on the government budget. The ltaLian case study does not
g'ive such a c[ear picture, essential[y because the mode[ is not equipped
to do so.
(a)  IIS_l?€l:!9_EfSfSiSg.  Whi le devaIuati on, by provokins infLation,
sets in motion the buiLt-in stabilizers of the government budget and thereby
generates a differentiat surptus of the pubLic sector re[ative to control,
in the long run this does not match the differentjaL current account sur-
pLus as in the u.K. study. In fact, by 1968, the change in the current
account is + 596 biLtion Lire, whereas the change in the government budget
is only + 104'bitLion tire.  Over the whole period the accumuLated change
in the current account is + 1171 biLlion Lire and the accumutated change in
the government budget is + 998 biILion Lire, thereby suggesting that  the
change in the net financial position of the private sector vis-i-vis the
tt,lo other sectors, public and extennaL combineci, is not very s'ignificant.This
condilsbn b i1 Line with the ,'New Cambridge  S chool,, but, on the othen hand, it
is not validated by the apparentLy persistent and grow'ing surpLus of the
current account reLative to the government  sector budget. As
atready pointeci out, in the ItaLian modeL this is ciue to
the persistent price advantage that deva[uation  confers on domestic producers 
1
(import substituters  and exporters), This is contrary to what happens in the
U-K- modeL" where as suggested by the "monetarist" school, devaLuation is
compLeteLy offset by inflation at the end of the oeriod.
(b)  rhs-1925:!9-Easrsjss- The conclusfons of the "New cambridse SchooL"
are even tess vaLidated in this exercise than in the 1963-68 one. Even though
devaluation generates a substantiaI and per'sistent differentiaL surpLus on the
current account, netative to controL there is no differentiaI surplus in the
government  sector.DeJ? Luarliql and f rice InrgaqS
In the monetarist model, devaLuation is in
by the price inf[ation that it  produces. This i
study but not in the lta[ian study.
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the Long run compLeteLY offset
s confirmed in the third U.K,
(a) I!S-1291!9__E#fS:SS. The evidence suggests that deva Luation has
a positive and substantiaL [ong-run effect on the current account due to
two main reasons  :
(i)  the persisting expenditure-switching effects of devaLuation
caused by the incompLete transmissJon of infLation into the domestic
price structure :
whiLe the price of Itatian exponts rises substantiaLLy  at
the beginning of the period, by the end of the second year
BA % of the price advantage given to ItaLian exporters
has been eroded by internationaL infLation. The domestic
price increase then LeveLs out and by the end of the
period internaL prices have on[y risen by 16.7'1,
thereby leaving a substantiaL competitive  margin on tire
export side. (See Graph 8).
on the import side, the prices of import substitutes aLso
rise, but more sLowly and even Less conpLeteLy. By the
end of the period the internal price structure has risen
only between 60 % and 70ll of the amount of devaLuation.
Thus an advantage ii  teft to domestic producers which en-
abLes them to compete with and substitute for imports"
(ii)  the persisting expenditure-reducing  effects of infLation"
particuLarLy  the reduction of reaL consumers expenditures on non-
durables, which, at the end of the period, are very depressed
(- ?.7 % in 1967 and - 2.4 % in 1968). These, in turn, affect
particularty the imports of food and agriculturaL products, which
in reaL terms are 7.1 Z beLow controt in 1968, whereas in the same
period totaL reaI imports are only 2.8 % below control. The import-
ance of the expend'iture-reducing effect retative to the expenditure-
switching effect is confirmed by anothen exercise performed over the
same period. In this exercise devaLuation has been accompanied byLlo
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measures to keep totaI domestic expenditure  (absorption)constant-
As a resuLt the current account at the end of the period improves
by onLy 249 instead of 596 biLLion Lire.
These results do not disprove the monetarist view of the adjustment process.
In particutar, the monetarist approach impLjes that the expenditure-reducing
effect is on[y temporary because once reaL cash baLances have been rebuiLt
through Lower expenditure, the Latter returns to its  Long-run IeveL. This
cannot be tested by the modeL since expenditure in these types of Keynesian
modeLs is mainty determined by reaI disposabLe income nather than by reaI
wealth. In addition, in this model, contrary to the typicat monetarist  modeL,
it  is assumed that monetary authorities are able to offset the increase in
money supp[y that results from the differentiaL current account surpLus
created by the deva tuation.
(b)  I!S-l!Z!:99-SlSfSjSS.  As we have seen above the Long-run effective-
ness of devaLuation  on the current account i s great Ly reduced relative to tJ'le
1963-68 exercise. This is due mainLy to the aLmost comptete disappeaps66s,cf
a Iong-run expenditure-switching effect, rather than to the decreased roLe of
the expend'iture-reducing effect on absorption. In fact, by the end of the
period ItaLian export prices in tire rise by 99.7 y. of the devaluation
eLiminating completeLy the competitive advantage exporters initiatLy gained
from devaluation; in addition the internaL price stnucture rose 'in a range
between 78.8 % and 82.5 %, greatLy reducing the advantage given to import
subst i tuters.
The expenditure-reducing  effects are simitar to those of the pre-
ceding exercise, so white in the 1963-68 exercise the Levet of private con-
suners expendi'ture  on non-durables was depressed by 2.4 % at the end of the
period, in this exercise it  is depressed by 2.1 %. The LeveL of GNP in the
two exercises reduced by A.6 '/, and Q,9 % respect.iveLy.
Considering the timitations of the Italian modeL relative to the lJ.K.
modet, and, even more, relative to the requirements of  generaL equiLibriurn
approaches  such as the portfoLio and monetarist appnoaches to the baLance of
payments, it  is surprising how cLose the resuLts come to confirming those aL-
ready obtained by BaIL and others. In particuLar,th'ey support the view thatthe price advantage of a devaLuation i
which devaIuation generates. This is
period and the [arger the devatuation,
42.
s eventuatLy offset by the infLation
especiaLly true for the most recent
Th'is completes the review of seLected empinical evidence on the
origins and consequences  of exchange-rate changes. The evidence seems
consistent with the view expressed'in the OPTICA'75 Report, nameLy that
a countryrs exchange rate is very LargeLy a nominaI phenomenon. 0n the
one hand its  movements in a system of ftoat'ing exchange rates tend to
offset the differentiat  between the domestic and the irfernational inflation
rates, when appropriate[y rneasured.  0n the other hand the simuLation
experiments for the U.K. and ItaIy  suggest that sizeabLe downward movements
in the external value of the pound and the lire  have over Longer periods
been offset to a Larger and increasing extent by more rapid  infLation,
[eaving onLy few traces on the current externaI account and on domestic
reat variabLes. t,'lhiLe the impact on reat variables may not be negligibLe
over short peniods -  and may be en[arged somewhat by government  action on
prices and incomes -  the usefutness of exchange-rate changes in effecting
macroeconom'ic adjustments seems more timited than is generaLLy beL.ieved.
In Chapter Ir  some poLicy impLications of this for exchange-rate management
and monetary poticy are presented.43;.
/  AryNEX I-A
EMPIRIcALEVIDENCE0NTHEcoNF0RIVIITY0FEXcHANGE-
RATE CHANGES  h,ITH RELATIVE  RATES OF COST AND PRICE
I N FLA TION
1. Purpose of this Annex
Among the theoreticat assumptions underLying the OPTICA'75  repont the
notion that -  apart from temporary and erratic  fLuctuations -  exchange rates
move in  Line with reLative rates of infLation pLays a prominent roLe'
In Chapter I of the present Report empiricaL evidence on the vaLidity of the
purchasing power parity (PPP) hypothesis is summarized.  The purpose of this
annex is to provide some additionaL and more detaiLed information on that
issue.  The findings wiIL be reviewed mainLy under the foLLowing aspects :
-  How strong is the correLation between actuaL exchange rates and (differentL:y
defined) PPP, both on a bi[ateraL and an effective basis ?
-  How Large are short-term as llJeIL as Long-term deviatjons of exchange rates
from PPP ?
-  Are there systematic differences in intra-EC exchange rate conduct as opposed
to variations vis-A-vis third  countries ?
The findings have a bearing on the proposaLs for an EC exchange-rate
regime presented in Chapter II  of this  Report and on the definition of an eventuaL
Eurooean ParaLLeL  Currency (EPC) of stable purchasing poi{ef as discussed' -]-!!Sf
alia,  in 0PTrcAr75'
2. Method
The anaLys'is makes use of avaiLable empirical studies on PPP as far
as they are reLevant to our probLem. In addition, some suppLementary originaL
nesearch was undertaken in order to shed tight mainLy on the performance of
EC currencies, both on a biLateraL  and an effective basis-
In the bi LateraL case, we refer in our work as in oPTicA r75 to the
"most StabLe" currency. Therefore, the Dl'1  was generaLLy chosen as the base
unit.  Exchange rate averages are derived from daiLy spot rates in Frankfurt'l+L.
For matters of simpLicity, in the period 1961-1967 the officiaL pierities were
usecJ as a proxy for the market rates which were fLuctuating within a smaLL
i,rarg'in of i  1.5 percent around parity (DoLlar/DM ,!  .zS percent)-
Efjective exchange rates (and effective PPP) t,iere caLcuLated  by different
methods. In our ot"ln caLcuLations of effective  DM rates, singLe biLateraL
tracJe weights are utiLized, the weights applied being the 1968 shares of
German trade with the individuaL economies in totaL German trade with the
respective country group (sixteen industriaL countries; six EC countries,
excluding Iretand and Luxemburg; Snake countries excLud'ing/incLuding France).
Towards the end of  1976 the EC Commissionts caIcuLations of doubLy r';eighted
effective exchange rates (and reLative PPP) became avaiLabLe /  7  -7  ff,e
purpose of using double instead of single we'ights is to aLLow not onLy for
biIateraI trade reLationships between the standard country and its  trad'ing
partners but aLso for their  competit'ion on third markets. The method is
therefone conceptualLy superior to the tradit'ional weighting procedure  aLthough
simuLations done by the IMF indicate that the numericaL resuLts obta'ined by
differ"ent weight'ing schemes are rather smat[, at  Least when the weights are
reLated to the specific trade pattern of the country under review (rather than
to wortd trade shares) L'20  -7.  Our calculations are done on the basis of
(double) export weights the resuLts being recorded in tabLes i-A 8 -  9 of this
Annex and in tabLe 1 and graphs 2 -  3 of the ma'in report.
Exchange rates and price index numbers are mostLy quarterLy averages.
Two !ime-periods t,lere chosen-for invest'igation. First,  a Long-te'r_m period
extending from the early 1960s to the mid 1970s. For data reasons the actuaL
length of the period varies sLightLy depending upon the indices considered"
In selecting 1961 as the base period for the computations  on the DM it  was
assumed that the DM revaLuation in March 1961 succeeded in bringing the DM 
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exchange rates of most currencies roughLy in Line with absoLute biLateraL ppp'1
In fact,  no further par vaLue adjustments Here undertaken for more than six years,
i.e.  until  autumn 1967, 1963 and 1964 which in some cases had to be taken as
base periods are onLy slightLy inferior  to  1961, (d ifferences in) rates of
infLation being generaLLy rather smaLL in the earLy Sixties"  The period covers
mainLy years in which exchange rates were pegged.
Secondly, the Smithsonian Agreement of December 1971 was taken as the
start'ing point of a mediumpterm period which again stretches tiLL  1975 a 4 or
1976 A 2.  The post-Smithson'ian  exchange-rate structure represents the outcome
(1) For the US doLlar and probabLy at.so the pound sterLing, th'is assumpti.op
is open to doubt./,r;"
of {l $$rrcney rilrLiqnnent corrlprisinp oLt r,r..rjor Curr{:ncies;tncj Lrr:ir"l
basecJ upon objeCtive economi c ijriaLysi s (though "corre cterj" by
pcrtiticaL bargaining). The turn of 19i1 /?? appeats therefore as
a br'tter base period than any other cjate' in tlte late Si xt ies or
earLy Seventies. In the computations on ef'fect'i ve DItl exchange ratL"s
recorded in tabIes I-A.2.6 and graph1.64 the snritlrsonian Di{ cross-
rates and the average price levels in the period 1971 A 3 to 197? Q 2 have
been used as inrjex bases' The other caLculations are based upon 1972
Q 1 market exchange rates and prrices. As to the terminaL period,
reference is made to chapter I of this report.
For measuring  changes in competitiveness the fotLowing sources
of Llice and cost indjces have been used : 6aLculations referring to
t he D,vl were made on the bas'is of IMF data pubLished inthe historical
and current series of International F'inanciat St ati sti cs ( IFS); doubLy
r^reighted price data for 18 countries are from the EC Commissicn ^. L-7 -7;
unit labour cost data are frorn the OeCD Secretariat. F'igures from
different sources are not fuLly compatibLe, major eJ'ivergencies  being
noticeabLe  especialty in the case of whotesaLe prices. More generaLly,
atL time series have a number of shortcomings limiting thein evidence
on "true" changeS in PPP, the most important'imperfect'ion being that
national indices are computed according to different statisticaL
concepts, and therefore show considerabte variations in both coverage
and weighting ,rho*u, 1).
purchasing  power parities have been calcutated for the foLlow'ing
types of indjces  :
(a) The consumer price index (CPI) is taken as a proxy for changes
in the general price Level. This index which is generaLty used
as a major poLicy indicator has probably the best quaIity of aLL
ind'i ces considered.  The'i ndex includes services, and aLso
agri cuLturaL commodities whose Comestic pri ces ai'e ;iore
or tess poLiticalLy deter"mined and therefore sheLtered fron irterntiond.
competition. 0n the other hand it  <joes not incLude investment
goods, a major category of internationatLy traded goods. There
are great differr:nces in nat'ional weighting patterns /261277. taken
by itseLf, the cPI is therefore of onLy Limited vaLue for the
diagnosis of changes in a countryts competitive position-  It  may,'
however, serve as a usefr.tL yarclstick against which changes in
other indices can be checked-
(1) 0n the probLem of internationat index cornpar"isons  see, e-g- :
Sachverstbndigerrrat  zur lJegutachtung der gesamtwi rtschaft li chen
Ent wi ck Lung, i.ahresgutacjr.ten  1 968, Bundest ag sdrucksache V/ 3550,
tlonn, 2. oe,,eil56i*Tf65ll[I106-'113  (Lder of the Pres'ident of
the Statistisches  tsundesamt).46.
(b) The index of average vaLue of exports (AVX) - on export unit vaLues -
is being utitized to record changes in the price teveL of traded goods.
The index is a substitute for a genuine export price index which at
present is compiLed in Germany, Sweden, Fintand, Japan and AustraLia
onLy. Eesides the inaccuracies thereby generated other methodoLogicaL
and theoreticat drawbacks Limit the expLanatory  power of PPP
catcuLations  based upon AVX. Firstrto the extent that exports are irvoiced
in foreign currency, the amounts (or prices) entering the AVX (or export
price) index are themsetves heaviLy inf[uenced by the current exchange
rate - i.e. by the variabLe to be explained -z ES the reLevant va[ues
are transLated into domestic currency. SecondLy,  AVX indices are
caLculated by different methods : whereas most indices are Paasche
indices, some countries are computing Laspeyres or Fisherrs ldeaL
indices. Third LY, according to the [aw of one price one woutd expect
export prices aIways to adjust to exchange rate-changes, This equaLity
is not necessarily  an indication of a sustainabLe production equiLibriuml
profit rates in the export sector may be heaviLy squeezed under the impact
of an overvaLued currency, inducing production adjustments despite
apparent internationaL "competitiveness".
(c) The whotesaLe price index (IJPI) is intended to measure shifts in
competitiveness  due to changes in relative prices of tradeabLes.
Whereas the Law-of-one-price  objection raised against AVX (or any
export price index) is in principte aLso retevant to t,lPI, this index.
gives more weight to domestic cost and price factors, thus providing
a more baLanced indication of "true" competitive  changes. Given the
resource endowment and production structure of most industriat
countries, for the purpose of our anaLysis the index shouLd ideatLy
record price movements of domesticatty produced manufactured goods.
In fact, onty some countries compute  I,JPI and meet this requirement.
The indices pubLished in International FinanciaI Statistics which have
been used in caLcuLat'ing PPP vis-ir-vis Germany are defined as fotLows :
Fr an ce
Gerrnany
USA
United Kingdom
Betgium,  Denmark
Swi t zer Land
Net her L ands
ItaLy, Japan
Industriat Goods, Tax ExcL.
tdhoLesaIe Prices, IndustriaI
IndustriaL Goods
Industria[ Output
Home Goods
Home and Import Goods
not defined.
.1.'\i.
The EC data on WPI underLying the "erffective" PPP caIcuLations though being
cLassifiecJ as covering "Manufactures" are aLso "not strictLy comparabLe
.between one country and another. For a few countries indeed separate
indices of whoLesaLe prices of manufactured  goods do not even exist and for
othens their coverage is so restrjcted as to cast some doubt upon their
retiabil.ity as indicators." {  7  -7 . 
'
(d) Even greater statisticat weaknesses and intercountry differences in methodo-
Logy affect the unit Labour cost(ULC) index 1).
It  is a tooL which ought to be interpreted with special care. As both
wage and productivity changes enter the computation of the ULC index,
deficiencies in both series may be cumuLative. Indeed, supptementary
labour income, empLoyersr contributions to sociaL security and pension funds,
payrotL taxes and other wage-reLated cost etements are usuaLLy not incLuded
in the caLculation of the wage component of the index, Many countries do'
not even pubLish ULC indices themsetves. ULC data for France, BeLgium, the
NetherLands, SwitzerLand and (partly) ItaLy are OECD estimates derived from
the component series pubLished in OECD Main Economic Indicators. The
poor quality of this index is at variance with the great need for an index
measuring  changes in domestic cost elements (the most important being wages).
The shortcornings of the indices have to be borne in mind when interpreting
the resuLts of the PPP caLcu[ations.
As to the presentation of the findings both graphicaL and quantitative methods
are apptied. For the probLem and the period cons'idered the graphicaL
approach is a particuLarLy usefuL tooL to supptement tlre quantitative
anaLys'is, as numericaL results can often be expIained by speciaL potiticaL
or market factors easiLy visibLe or traceabLe from the graphs (sticky parities
and major interventions into ftoating rates on the one hand, targe swings
in market rates on the other).
In addition to the standard coefficients of regression anaLysis the
Root Mean Square Error (RlvlSE) is emp[oyed, For the purpose of our subject
RMSE is defined as
RI4S E
(1) For a short
va ri at i ons
descript
see OECD
ion of data onobLems and methodoLogi caL
18 (Dec. 75) gqqng!'ic  Out took, No.48.
where PPP is the (retative) purchasing power parity and ER the exchange
rate' both expressed as index numbers" Rather than measuring variations
of exchange rates around their  mean, RMSE gives an inclication of the average
percentage Cev'iatio n,  irrespective of sign, of actuaI exchange rates from
the vaLue to be expected on the grounds of the PPP theorem.
3, Long-term blrs lat ion
l,Jhen evaluating the empiricat evidence one must bear in mind
that the anatysis is referring toconformity between PPP and actuaL rather
than equiLibrium exchange rates.  Thus the fact that prior to  1973 parities
hrere generaLty fixed is  important. The (rather short) ftoating period since
1973 0 2 was, at Least in the beginning, distorted by the aftermath of
disequiLibria which had been buitt  up during the past.  Moreover, exchange
rates far from being fuLLy ftexibLert"lere  more or Iess subject to interven-
tions by monetary authorities ("managed fLoating"). The countries par"t'icipant
to  the European currency bIock ("Mini-Snake") are stiLL rraintaining fixed
cross rates within a margin of !  z.zs p.c. around parity.  Therefore,
rather than detracting from the PPP hypothesisrdeViations of observed
exchange rates from PPP wiLL often indicate the need for an acijustment
of sticky exchange rates.
Bearing this  reservation -  and the reservation on the index
quaLity -  in mind we first  consider some [ong-term reIationships.
AvaiLabLe studies generat[y record a strong correLation  between long-term
exchange rate changes and cfianges in PPp, both on a bitateral  and an
effective basis, ULC being the exception to this  ru[e.  rn tabLe I-A-1
the resuLts of some recent cross-section studies are summari zed. /_-15 _7
These show that,  ctose to 90 p.c. of the do[Lar exchange rate changes
of major currencies in the period 1955-1974  are exptained by changes
in reLative t,jPI (vis-i-vis  the U.S.),, correLation being sornewhat lower
for the fixed-exchange-rate sub-period lgss-1971.  The resuLts atso
demonstrate the superiority of lr|PI oven CPI which is especiaLLy  apparent
for the fuLL twenty-years  period lgSS-1gTS.
Our findjngs, though generatLy supporting this  evidence, give a
more differentiated picture.As to biLateraL price and exchange-rate reLations
(with Germany as the reference country)  correIation coefficients
of cross-section anatyses (see tabLe 1 and graph z of main text)  are
Lower than in the studies mentioned where the U.S, dottar uas taken as the
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standard currency, yet, they are stiIL satisfactory as far as tipl and
AVX are concerned.  However, corretation between exchange*rate  changes and
changes in relative consumer prices is poor.
Looking at time series data (see graph I-A-1 and tabLes I-A-2 to IAS)
again on a biLateral basis, the coefficients of determination for Denmark,
the U.K., Itaty,  France and Japan are above.80 (tJpI Japan .68),
for the Nethertands, Bel.gium and the u.s. they are somewhat lower.
There is only titt[e  correlation in the case of Sw'itzerLand,  As to the
type of index, AVX gives the best fit  uith l,lPI and CPI being only sLightly
inferior.
RMSE provides more distinct  resu[ts by estabt ishing the ctear
inferiority  of cPI and the ctear superiority of AVX, with |.Jpl hoLding
the middLe rank.  This outcome agrees both llith  theoreticaI expectations
and the graphicaI evidence produced in graph I-A-5.
In addition to their generaILy Loll vaLue, AVX coefficients
ftuctuate onLy stightty across countries (with the exception of
switzerLand).  rt  appears, therefore, that there is  indeed a rather
strong internationat connection of prices for traded commodities, export
prices being primariLy determined by the prices prevaiLing  on the h'ighLy
competitive worLd markets and only to a Limited degree by (differentia[)
domestic cost and price conditions. Because.of the fLexibte adjustment
of export prices to changes in exchange rates, AVX is a poor indicator
of changes in internationaI competitiveness.
That domestic conditions vary greatLy and that the price Links
(i-e.  the internaI price ratios) betwebn the exposed and shel"tered sectors
are by no means identica[ across countries becomes evident when the RMSE
coefficients for  CPI are considered. Not only are they much higher than
for AVX but they show significant differences, especiaLLy for the u.s.
and the U.K.  These countries have high ntqSE coefficients indicating Large
average deviations of exchange rates from PPP. Whereas it  appears from
graph I#1 that the high numbers are at least partLy due. to the choice
of the base peniodr 1961, which uas a year when both doLLar and pound were
aLready overvalued - this  expLanation does not ruLe out a possible contri-
bution of other factors.  No attempt is  made to expLain the summary
deviations (in terms of CPI) on a dountry-by-country basis.  In addition
to structural economic and institutionaL factors -  e.g. degree of openness
of an economy, existence of rage-indexing schemes etc. -  the foLLowing
eLements may have infLuenced the RI{SE coefficient :(1
J  r.
Countries chancre Rates and Relative Prices of  Six
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Tab1e LA 2 : Statist'i cal Evirjence on C onfornljty
between Dl{-exchange  i*rteS arld PPP
- Summary_gf Time series Analyses
Ooefficierrt of
WPI  CPT
Determi-nationa
AVX WPI
RMSE
cpr A\i)(
Netherlands
Belgium
Denmark
France
U. K.
Italy
USA
Japan
Switzerland
16 Industrial
countries
6  EC countries
Mini-Snake
Snake incl.  France
16 Industrial
countries
6 EC countries
Mini-Snake
Snake inc1. France
b)  1972
.539
.584
.307b
.335b
.493
.584
.887
.88s
.897
.922
. 610
.681
.135
.845
.87 4
.646
.79(..j^
a)  1961
.808
.648
.859
.821
.908
.812
.426
.819
.122
.869
.859
.826
.834
1 975
.57 6
.7g^9
.929
.955
.962
.916
.914
.819
.343
.943
.945
.780
.920
1 975
.815
.859
.630
."7.57
.084
. 058
. 082
. 066
.162
.a71
.193
. o70
. o70
. 061
. 058
.066
. 054
. 041
. 028
. 028
.029
. 082
.052
.1 15
. 104
.214
.121
.260^
.17 3
.(J^67
. 064
:(J^67
. 059
.a47
.o77
.{J-71
.038
.o42
. 040
.049
.043
. o40
.a71
. o64
.|.-]-67
. o69
.17 5
.o35
. 036
. 035
. 031
.7 67
.869
. s93
.821
.o36
. 034
. 053
. 039
AI1 but two coefficients  are
the 99 percent level.
Significantly  different  from
signlficantLy  different'  from zero at
zere at the 95 percent level.
1961-1975
1977-1975
see Graph I.A
see 6raph I.A
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',fable I.A 3;  Regre,ssion  Analyses:  DM e Rate_! an.j Fetative wnoLesale.prices
Equatlon DIJ t, -7
K
a) 1961 t  rgTl;
Ne therlandr
Belgiun
Denmark
France
U. K.
Italy
LI ni ted Statrt
Japan
Swi tzerland
A6 Industrlrl
Coun trl  es
E. C.
Ml n i -Snake
Snake ( tncl.
France )
-56.?{8 +
-29.622 +
1].898 +
t
t
16 Industrlal
Countrl es
E. C.
Ml n1 -Snakc
Snake (lnol.
France )
ERut
ERn
ERnK
ERF
Efu.tr.
ERt
ERus
ERJ
ERcg
ERtc
ERE. c.
Ehst
ERrc
ERE. c.
Efustt
ERsr,
r  llO.0O5 +
!  -2.85tt +
r  4,69a +
r  -55.987 +
r  -82.119 +
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r-142.292 +
|  -9.602 +
r  5J.54O +
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B
tPloK
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'Plu.r.
vpt r
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,ptcE
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tPlE. c.
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9. 019
21,475
21.t7,
22,462
26,A67
9.5t6
It..tr1
t.ol2
L7.764
20.Ot5
10.287
L,r.716
6.78o
9.657
4.5t6
8. OOO
.578
. ggo
. s90
1"114
1.760
1.lJg
2,161
1.115
. t5o
.182
.17 5
.2J8
.295
,20,
.r5a
.tgz
.t79
.215
.2t7
.229
.180
.2O5
;193
.584..
..iio7
.,po j;
.o97 '
.9?2 "
.61\re
.681'.i
.135'
t. ,11
t,256
.ga5
I
I
a
-5.9tO + 1"O57 ,p1l'
-  ,79, + 1.015 tp1E.C.
27,O75 +  ,727 ,pll.tso
15.512 +  ,811r ,plsn
lltE.
D. E.
DtlJ.
D.9,
.F45'
.87+
..646
-790'
.767 t
.869'
,593-,
.821n
ERgo :  'Lh'-75t + 1.1o, tPlso
b) tg72 -  tg75
Quarterly data, tg6l e 1oo ^na,lTz8'q-t 
E 1oo, reepectlvery. Note tbat for technlcal reasons parltles  had to-ue'"{b"tltuied  fir  cxchange ratec ln  tbc pertod 1961  tg67: 
-
Expttt*1r11:tr: ER, I  DH erchang€ rate lnder of tho.currcncy of country 1,
!.-.r  I  . wprl" 
%.  ratlo  of vholceale pflcc lndlocr of oountry I  rnd Ocrnjny,
t/r s t-valur of rlgroralon oottllOlratr  DU: Durbln-yrtloa, R2 = coe,ffiiient *-
6f- determinatibn-55.
Tnble r.A 6 :
-rre
Equatlon
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,E59 "'
,8?1
.908
.812:,
.426.,
.81e i
.12?*,
ERt
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France )
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I
!
b) tg?' -  t975
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Quarterly data, t96t s 1OO and 1t972 e I  *  tOO, reepect'lvely. Note that
technical reasons parltles had to be sqbstltuted for  exchanSo rstos ln
poriod 1961  1967.
0xplanatlon: ER, rl DM exohange ratc ln{cx ol  the.ourrGnoy of country It
cPI I cpli  . 6i;ii  r retlo  ol  Gontunor prloe lndlotr  ol  country I  rnd Oorntnyt
t'n I  t  vslue of rr3rrrrlon  oorftlolut,  DY u Durbln-Ultronr
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R- = coefficient of determination
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Table .I.A-5 !
-
ress 1 0n Lat i've
Equatl on
Ne therl4ndg
Be I glun
Dennarlr
France
U. K.
ftaly
(ini ted Statee
Japan
Swl tzerlend
76 Industrlal
Countrleg
E. C.
Minl-Snake
Snake (tncl.
Frauce )
4.6 Industrlal
Countri es
E. C.
Minl -Snelie
Snake (lncl.
France )
a) 1961 -  t97j
14,928 +  .858
-2\.7O0 + t.Z6\
-r.871 + {'.O05
-t5.69z + *.o92
-3;O.28tr + l,Zr9
-!.695 + t.oig
-25.6t, +, 1.23O
-  .O94 + 1.O5Ir
76.775 +  .z!z
'15.059 + 1.11O
-15.777 + t,.145
-5,656 + !.O62
ERNt,
ERg
ERnx
EIIF
ERu.tr.
ERr
ERus
ER.l
ERctr
ERrc
ERE. c.
Et*so
I
ERtc
ERs'
g. g?q
11.910
27..7\\
55,146
18.847
24.97t
24. gog
t6.227
5.5tt
,26L
.2go
.47L
,662
.449
.557
.6zL
.574
.264
<7A
.709,
.929
.955
.962
.916
.914
.819
.313
ERE. c.  !t
E\rsr,
tll
!
IE
r|
a
r
t
""*\lu
"t*{|
tY*rJ4'
avxF
t"*u.d,
avxl
atxus 
, avxJ  .
avxcE
I
It
I
avxrc
8vx8. c.
suhst
,a,go7
7L.272
74.54t
25.,662
7.85A
9.26t
A.89rl
6.594
.5L6
.427
.295
.596
.943,
.945
.750
i9Z0
.615 ,
.859
.630
.7sY.
b) tg7? -  rgT|,
22.858 +
2\.222 +
60.128 +
57.+29 +
.788 "r*Iq .779 
"r*ql, C,
. rrog sv\qn
.629."*qsi
[.  C.
ll .!r
D.6 r
ll .8.
-Bso  r' -15.790 + t,|,z\ .osr  ,
197103- -Quarterly data, tg6t = 1OO technical reasons parltlee
.period t96t  tg67.
AVX.
avxt = n{  = ratlo  of  average valuc
p"g/197? I  1. =.100r respecttvely, Note that for had to bo aubetltutqd for exchango ratee 1p tb;
Explanatlon: ERt g IIM'exchange rate l,nder of the curreucy of countr7 t,
of export lndlcep .ot countrlr 1,a$d
G.l*toFr.to e t  value of regreqelon qoefficleqq, DIf r  Dupbln-Uatcoa,
Ra = coef flci ent of determinat ion.'
,l57'.
Exchange rates may not have oincided w'ith PPP in the base year 1961 (U'S"
U.K.)
Stickiness of exchange rates under conditions of diverging infLationary
trends may have brought about (temporary) reat exchange'rate  changes
which wouLd not have occured under more flexible conditions (Snake
countries)
FinanciaL transactions, for interest arbitrage or SpecuLative reason$
(both economic and poLiticaL) may have caused nominat exchange rates
to deviate temporariLy from current PPP, internaI price adjustments
taking place with a time Lag andlor being not fuLty accommodating in
the short run.
Graph FAr-1 demonstrates
Less significant rote
that these factors have indeed pLayed a more or
for the countries under review.
As to wPI, in six out of nine cases the RMSE coefficients are s'ignificantLy
[ower than for CPI. Again the U.S. and the U.K. are shown to have by far
the targest deviations of exchange rates from PPP (RMSE :  .193 and '162,
respectiveLy) whereas coefficients for the other seven countries of the
sanpLe (inctuding  Japan) cLuster reIativeLy ctose together within a band
ranging from .058 for BeLgium to .084 for the NetherLands' Graphs I-A-1 6nd
FA5 provide additiona( information  on the course of reLativewhoLesaLe
prices with respect to exchange-rate  movements'
FinaLLy, as far aS reLative costs are concerned, graph I-A-2
demonstrates that for onLy two countries out of six (United Kingdom, ItaLy)
is there a positive correLation between changes in reLative unit Labour
costs and exchange rates in the long run, the negative correLation in
four other cases (NetherLands,  Be[gium, France, United States) being
contrary to theoreticaL expectations and to the resu[ts obtained for
retative prices. It  was feLt, therefore, that caLcutating the correLation
coefficient or RMSE was of l.itt[e use in the biLateraL case'
Turning now to the "gl&ctiw"  case, cross-section anaLyses of
(differentLy defined) inftation d'ifferentiats  and exchahge rate changtls
- both doubLy weighted by export shares - for a group of 18 countries
over the 1963 -  1975 period exhibit a good correLation in the HPI and56.
AVX cases (with coefficients of determination of .g0z and .g02,
respectiveLy;  cf.  tabLe 1 and graph 2 of main text).  Again, cpr performs
rather poorLy. As one routd expect, correlation is gereratLy higher than
in the biLateraL exampte (ulith Germany as the refenence country).0n an
average, exchange-rate changes appear to be targety accommodating  to
changes in retative prices: the sLopes of the regression Iines are
ctose to unity.
For Germany, correIations  between effective reLative pr.ices
and effective  DM exchange rates vis-ii-vis four groups of countries -
16 industriaL econom'ies;  EC countries, Mini-snake,  snake, incIuding
France -  have been examined (see tab[es r*z-5 and graph lilr3), using simpLe
export we'ights for the period 1961 -  1975. It  is  interesting to note that
correLation for the groups of sixteen industriaL and six EC countries
turned out to be better than for the Mini-Snake. No significant differences
between groups are observab[e as far as RMSE is  concerned, the snake
(inct'  France) coefficients being onLy sLight[y superior to those of the
rest of the sampLe. ALtogether the effective DM rate has been more in
Line with "effective" PPP than was noticeable for  any of the biLateraI
reLationships (with the partiat exception of the German-BeLgian  case).e Rates and RelatiVe ,lUtti! Labour Costs of  Five
Excha
ntries a
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Medi um-Term Corre Lation
For an investigation of the medium term the period 1972-1975 was
chosen, assuming that the smithsonian Agreement did in fact succeed
in aligning par vaLues at a tevel consistent with abso[ute ppp (see
above).The anaLysis has been confined to tlre "effective"  Dl4 and the
ulc.
In the effective  Dt'l case, corre[ation between trade-weighted PPP
and the DM rate is generalLy lower than for the Longer period 1961-1975;
for the Mini-snake correLation is rather poor (see tabLesl-A-2 -.5 and
graph I-A-4). t,rlith respect to RMSE the effective DM rate vis-d-vis the
fvlini-Snake and Snake currencies performs quite weLl, the same being true,
as far as relative IJPI and AVX are concerned, vis-A-vis the groups of EC
currencies and industriaI countniest currencies, 0nce again, ppp
based upon cPr has the worst fit.  It  appears that the average per-
formance of the effective rate vis-a-vis the industriaL  and Ec
economies was mainty impaired by the Large deflection of the nominaI
DIY rate in 1973 whereasrwithin the (fvlini-) snake,deviations of effective
DM rates from effective Ppp have mainly been due to the increasing
inf tation dif f erentia L whi ch uras not compensated by equiva Lent parit,y
adj ustment s.
An examination of the ULC case produces resuLts which are no better
than those obtained for the Lo6ger period 1951-1975 (see graph I-A-2).
only three out of eight 1) cases (u,K. ,  LtaLy, Japan). , t here is
a reasonabIy good corretation between reLative uLC vis-a-vis Germany
and DM exchange rates whereas in three other cases (Betgium,
France, switzer[and) there is virtuaLLy no cornelation and in two
cases (NethenLands, u.s.) correlation is even negative. As to RMSE
the u.s, and u,K, again stand out for their high coefficients (signi-.
fying [arge deviations), the rest of the sampLe being characterized
The coefficients for Japan and switzer[and which are not given,in graph r*Zgre as foltows :
Japan :  R- = 694 (R = 831), RMSE = ,025,
Switzerland :  R' = .OZ4 e  = .154), RflSE =,05g The correLation coefficient for Japin is significantLy different from zero.at. the 99 per cent LeveL. The coefficient for SwitzerLand did not stand the t-test at the 95 per cent significance Leve[.
(1)C
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by a wide dispersion of numericat va[ues. 0n the whoLe the data do
not support the hypothesis of a cLose conformity of exchange rates
with retative ULC, at Least as far as the biLaterat case (with Germany
as reference country) is concerned.  Among the reasons expLaining this
outcome the methodotogicaL  weaknesses of the index mentioned above
appear to be of major importance. AIso, the neg[ect of other cost
eLements, apart from Iabour, is l.ikety to have influenced the resuLt.
Rea I  Exchange-Rate VariabiIity
As is evident from the RMSE coefficients,, the marg'ins by which
nominaL exchange rates have been deviating from relative ppp vary
greatly depending upon the countries and indices considered. In order
to obtain additionaL insight into the time distribution,  size structure
and causes of variations in reaL exchange rates f  ZZ_7 we have pLottedd.em
(9rap,'tt 144-6 and graph 3 of main report) and ctassified  them according
to size (tables I-A-5 and 7).
0n the whoLe our findings support Vaubelts find'ings of a substantiaI
variab'iLity of reaI exchange rates though it  appears that his resuIts
have been much infLuenced by his ihoice of price index (consumer prices)
f  27J.  Indeed, both the graphs and the figures demonstrate that ex-
change-rate deviations are Largest when reLative consumer prices are
taken as the standard of reference. 87 per cent of alL biLateraL
quanterLy  AVX observations over the 1961'1975 period are concentrated
within the 10 pen cent margin of deviations,6l per cent within the
5 per cent margin, the rest is majnty explained by speciaL movements
of AVX in switzerLand. As to I'JPI, again B0 per cent of aLl quarterty re-
suLts are within the 10 per cent marg'in, with 48 per cent in the 5 per-
cent nange. 0n the other hand, onty two thirds of aLI quarterLy exchange
rate deviatfons from bitateral  cPI are beLow 10 per cent, and onLy
41 per cent below 5 per cent.  For the "effectjve" DM cases concentration
in the Lowen brackets (under 5 and 10 per cent deviations, respectivety)
is  even higher (see tab[es I-A-6 and 7).Aq vJ.
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3gU:g-g:? : Distribution of ReaL Exehange Rates for ReLative AVX,
WPI and CPI,1961 -  1975
* in poroent of total num'ber of ouartorly data _
trtoviations of  exchange rates from lllt  ln percerrt
o - 5f,  \-LO/"  I0-  %  total
AVX
WPI
cPr
-  Bilateral  DM relaiionsa -
50.6 f"  26., y'"  r3.o y'o  loo /,
4B.z y'.  jz,?_ y'"  19.6 /"  mo /"
4L.3 ,8"  2-5.9 /"  3z,B fi  no y'"
Avx
TIP I
cI
-  Effoctive )M relationsb -
89,6 /"  g.Z %  t.z %  Loo "ft
59.2 y'"  27 .9 y',  1-Z.g f"  J:oo /,
63.8 f"  a7,9 y',  8.3 f,  roo /"
a) 540 quartcrly d.ats per lnd"ox  b) 240 quarterl-y d,ata pot. irrriex7 t"'
From the graphs 'it  appears that large real exchange-rate  osci L La-
tions have mainLy occurred prior to  1969 and since 1gr3.  Two main
exp lanations lend themselves. Fi rst,  the sti ckiness of offi cia L ex-
change rates under the Bretton Woods system and in the Mini-Snake has
produced (temporary) reaL exchange-.rate changes among participants of
the arrangements as their  infLation rates continued to differ.  This is
particuLarly obvious in our case where the Least .infLating country
was taken as the reference country. Graphs 1-A-5 and 6  demonstrate that
aLI economies experienced "reaL" appreciations of their  currencies vis-i-
vis the D-Mark between 1961 and 1969. The 1969 DM revaLuation and again
the 1971 reaLignment (partly)  wiped out pneviousLy accumulated dis-
parities  (in terms of CPI and WPr). Large and persistent inflation  diffe-
rentiaLs arnong the members of the European currency bLock (Mini-Snake)
since 1974 once again brought ahut reaL exchange-rate changes; this  is
c[ear[y shown by graphs I-A-4 -  6 For the totaL period since the smith-
sonian Agreement tiL[  1975 a 4 the reaI appreciation  of the Mini-snake
currencies with resoect to the D,r amounted to 6.5 per cent in terms
of cPr and 3-8 per cent in terms of r,lpl (see tabLe I-A-6).
secondLy, targe fluctuations of fLoating exchange rates -  for the
Di'l  as h,eL L as f on other f l"oating currencies -  have resuLted in
(sometimes  temporary) reaL exchange-rate  movements. Th.is has mainLy
been truefor the Di',,l in  1973 and 1974 and for the pound Sterling, the
Lira and the French franc since the oiL crisis  (see graph 3 of main
report).
Deficiencies of the exchange market mechanism ;  rigidity  of parities
on the one hand; destabil"ising specuLation fostered by Lack of reLiabLe
criteria  to judge the future course of monetary and exchange rate
action, on the other, and the (arbitrary)  choice of the terminaL period
expfain in part the 1975 (1976 A U  reat exchange-rate changes reLative to
1961/ 1963 and 1972 A1 (see table  I "A-6 for the Dtvl tables I-A-g to 9 for
eLeven currencies), changes wh'ich have sometimes been substantiaL, both
in cPr and in lrlPr terms,  These deficiencies exp[ain also part of the
reaL exchange-rate changes observed by vaub"t a  zTJ  over the 1g5g-1gr5
per.iod which, r^hiLe being calcuLated as compound annuaL average rates, are
conparabLe in size.71.
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t^Jhat part of the observed reaL exchange-nate change5 is to be dtrbuted
to these deficiencies cannot be easily answered since other eLements -
index number probLems, productivity bias, terms-of-trade changes -  are
aLso important and require "needed" changes in reaI exchange rates.
Our proposal on a system of coordinated monetary and exchange-rate
management in the Etj  (Chapter II  of this report), impLies that re-
quired changes would tend to be smaLt if  an appropriate  index was
appIied to PPP caLcuLations  and that such changes would gain weight
in the LonEer term onLy. Under the current circumstances  the
economic benefits of stabiLising exchange rates with'in a band around
PPP therefore appear to be h'igher than the costs.7t*.
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I^JAGE AND SALARY  iNDEXATION IN EC COUNTRIES
Be Lsi um
Automatic adjustment of wages and saIaries to a cost-of-Living
index has been widespread in BeLgium since 1948. At present about 95 7. of
aLL wage and saLary earners are coverd by automatic adjustments based on
the CpI.  The exact method of adjustment varies from sector to sector,
according to coLLective agreements. The reference period fon caLcuLating
changes in CpI varies from one to three months. The Lag urith which adjustment
is  made has been shortened graduatLy in recent years; it  often occurs with Less
than a monthts deLay. Adjustment is  usuaLLy contingent on the change in the
.index exceeding 2%.  In so{ne cases, notab[y the banking sector, the adjustment
provides for  wages to increase by a Larger percentage  than the corresponding
increase in the CPI/ in order to cover a faster rise in items which are not
incLuded in this  index, such as rent and progressive taxes.  Indexation of
pay in the public sector was intnoduced by Law in 1960, and the same
provisions appLy to sociaL seculity payments and to wage scaLes used in
caLcuLating sociaL security contributions. During the first  three quarters
of  1976 indexation was suspended  on month[y earnings above B.fr.  40,000.
0n the whoLe BeLgium at present has the most compLete  and continuous
indexation  system in the Community.
Denma  r k
Wage and saLary indexation has been widespread in Denmark since the
1920, s and practicaLLy  universaL since 1945. Indexation is embod'ied in
LegisLation concerning the majority of pubtic empLoyees wbereas indexation of
wages and saLaries in the private sector is  subject to the two-year coLLective
agreements. Regulation takes pLace twice a year and was untiL 1975 in the form
of a percentage addit'ion in the pubLic sector; since then aLL cost-of-Living
aLLowances have been fixed in absolute terms.  In the private sector the
cost-of-L'iving  aILowance has been fixed in the cotlective agreements, usuaLLy
in the form of a standard amount for  aLL wage and salary earners. In the
( 1) Thi s annex draws heavi Ly on "Some lssues in l^jage lndexat'ion", a work'ing
paper submitted by the Commission staff to the Group for Coordination of
Short-term Economic and FinanciaL PoLicy in November 1976. For a more
detaiLed, but Less up to date survey, see Braun/, Anne Romanis, "Indexation
of wages and SaLaries in DeveLoped Economics",  InternatjonaL Jlonetarv
Fund !lgfl_E-e.pg.te,  March 1976.7ci
private sector the aLLowances have compensated on average 60-70 i| of the
increase in the cost-of-Living; they have been trigqered tw{ce annualLy with
a short deLay.
In 1976 a departure from automatic indexation  was introduced by a
stipulation that no more than two cost-of-Living adjustments wouLd be
reteased in 1977. Any addit'ionaL aLlowances t"iouLd be paid by the
Government into a suppLementary pension fund and not used for an increase
in take-home pay.  0n two previous occasions the Government  has temporari Ly
compensated empLoyers for cost-of-living aLLowances paid out.
The widespread system of indexation has met with criticism from many
quarters particuLarLy for its  faiLure to distinguish between higher imporl
prices (deteriorat'ing terms of trade) and others sources of infLation.
A Government Commission, report'ing in 1974, was unabLe to devise generaLl:/
acceptabLe  ways of applying this distinction"
France
There are no common rules on cost-of-Liv'ing  adj ustment; 'indeed, an
0rdonnance of  December 1958 gnaduaLty outlawed indexation of wages and
saLaries by the 'general price index.  Nevertheless, a number of different
methods are in use/ depending  on whether the agreements reLate to the tarr;e
pubLic sector enterprises on to the private Labour market.
For a number of public sector enrployees an ex-ante indexation appLies.
One or two year agneements are concLuded, covering branches of act'ivity or singLe
pubLic sector firms.  In these agreements a certain percentage increase in
reaL purchasing power is  aimed for over the com'ing year.  The agreements  ilhen
add to that rate the expected infLation rate.  If  the cost-of-L'iving rises
faster than expected in the coLLective agreements, a proportionaL compensiltion
is made. For exampLe, at the beg'inning of  1973 coLLective agreements whir:h
entered into fonce with an increase in nominal wages at 6 % were aimed
at guaranteeing an increase in real wages of Z-3 %.
For a smaLt part of the work force (less than one rn'iLLion workers)
a speciaL minimum wage (SI!}IC) appLies. The SMIC is  indexed on the cost*o1'-L'iving
for certa'in emp Loyees and 'is increased beyond thi s by the ri se in product:ivity
for the nation as a whole.
In the private Labour market there exist a number of colLective
agreements which contain a right to renegotiate agneements if  the price index
rises faster or if  there is  in other respects a major change in the economic
situat ion.76.
'  The Barre PLan of September 1976 recommended that wage increases
in the private sector be confined to 6 112 per cent in  1977, corresponding
to the official  target for rises in the CPI for that year; increases in the
pubtic sector wouLd simiLarty be Limited.
Germany
Under Articte 3 of the Currency Law of June 1948, as interpreted
since 1961, any indexation of the nominaI value of  DM financial assets is
forbidden r-lithout express authorization by the Deutsche Bundesbank. The
appLication of this  Law to wage settLements  has been questioned as being
contrary to the principLe of free coLLective bargaining. In practice, the
Lau has been taken to prohibit automatic adjustment cLauses but not provisions
for automatic renegotiation of contracts when the cost-of-Living index
exceeds a certain LeveL. Beginning in 1963, in connection with the concLusion
of  Long-term contracts covering more than one year, cLauses of this  type
were introduced in a Iimited number of cases. German trade unions consider
that they can obtain a revjew of h,age contracts even in the absence of formaL
renegot'iation  cLauses, in the case of sharp price acceLerations.
Iretand
hlage increases are determined under a nationaL agreement between
empLoyers and the Congress of Trade Unions, which appLies to the private
sector and to pubIic empLoyees whose pay is  subject to coLtective bargaining.
Agreements at industry LeveL are concLuded  under this  master "frame" agreement.
The indexation is basicaLLy an assurance against increases in the cost-of-Living
index beyond a certain figure.  For example, it  t"las agreed, at the end of
1973, that increases in the cpr beyond 10'l  would be fu[y  compensated
by cost-of-Living adjustments. For emp[oyees in the pubIic sector cost-of-
Liv'ing adjustments foLLow the same pattern as  the nationaL wage and salary
agreement in the private sector.
ItaLy
Cost-of-L'iving adjustments were introduced in certain industries
after the Second lJorLd War, and this  system was graduaILy extended under the
nationaL wage agreements to other sectors.  ALmost aLL wage and salary
earners in the private and pubtic sectors are now covered by some form of
sLiding scaLe (scaLa mobi Le).77.
In the private sector, adjustment is usualty made at quarterLy
.intervaLs, but it  applies only to that part o'f earnings dist'ingu'ished as.
"indemnification for the cost of Living".  This is a fixed amount depending
on the wage earner's qualifications and age,  Except in bank'ing and insurance,
where the value of each point on the sliding scaLe is  established as a
percentage of the totaL earnings of the worker, the compensation appLies
to [ess than haLf the Levet of earnings. For each increase of 1 lj in the
cost-of-living index/ h/age earners rece'ive a sum equal to 1 % of the average
wage for that type of work in 1957, the base-year for the caLculation  of
the index.  The CPI used is based on the average expenditure of a famiLy
with two chiLdren in 1957. This system of adjustment has come in for
criticism in recent years because of the shanp rise in the cost-of-living
reLative to the base-year and because of the considerabte discrepancies  in
compensation between occupationaI  groups.
As a result of these criticisms it  was agneed with the sociaL
partners to harmonize by February 1977 the compensatory  amounts in practicaLLy
atL sectors at the highest level which existed under the otd system.
During the transitionaL phase most industriaL workers have been receiving
more than proportionaI  cornpensation for cost-of-Liv'ing increases.  The
Andreotti government,  formed after the June 1976 elections, has aimed -
so far without success -  at modifying the degree of automat'icity of
indexation.
Lux embou rg
Automatic indexation of b,ages and saLaries to the CPI (excluding
rent) has been appLied since 1921 and now covers nearLy the entire  Labour
force.  ALI wages in the public sector and a minimum wage in the private
sector are reguLated by the same method. If  agreements between empLoyers
and empLoyees in the private Labour market presuppose a further cost-of-Living
adjustment, this is  made aLong the same Lines.  No ceiLing applies to the
cost-of-L'iving  adj ustments. Accord'ing to the pri:sent system/ every change
in the average value of the CPI over a six months'period, relative to the
prev'ious date of reguLation, of at  Least z 1/z %, entails a proportionaL
wage change.7E.
Net her L ands
.  UntiL approximateLy  1970 the sociat partners were left  with a certain
degree of freedom with respect to wage indexation, but foL[ow'ing the passing
of a Law in January 1972 on the statutory minimum wage, approximateLy 90 %
of atL wage and saLary incomes in the private [abour market, covered by
colLective agreements, have become indexed on the CpI.
Indexation usuaLLy takes pLace twice a year, but varies from
industry to industry.  In some agreements, 'indexation is  made retroact
at the expiry of the agreement and depends on the rise in the cpl,  whj
in other agreements a preLiminary alLowance'is g'iven, depending on the
in the price Level as estimated at the time of the agreement; a final
is then made at the expiry of the agreement. occasionalLy the roLe of
in the reguLation is  Limited to a certain shane of the observed price
increases,  whiLe in other cases, there is  no such timitation.  rn some
adjustments are made as a pencentage of the wage, whiLe in other cases
amount is  added.
iveLy
Ie
i nc rease
reguLation
the index
cases wage
a fixed
PubLic sector employees have no immediate cost-of-Living  adjustment/
but through an assunance of a trend, paraLLeL to the wages in the private
sector, pubLic sector employees are assured a simiIar rise in percentage  terms.
The adj ustment here i s of an ex-ante k'ind, buiLding on a forecast of wage
trends in the private Labour market, subsequentLy  adjusted when the statistics
of wages become avaitabLe. In the pubLic sector cost-of-living adjustments
are made once a year retroactiveLy; the empLoyees are aLso compensated  for-
the loss of income due to the fact that their  wages are adjusted at a Later
point in time than in the private labour market.
United Kingdom
At no time in the post-war perioci has there been automatic cost-of-
Living adjustment of wages and sataries in the United Kingdom of a nationaL kind.
Some [ocat agreements, however,  embody wage indexation. In November 1973
so-caLLed  threshoLd agreements, originalLy recommended by the Trade Union
Congress in 1971' were introduced as part of the Governmentrs  income poLicy.
These threshoId agreements stipuLate maxima for the kind of cost-of-l.iving
aLlowances, wh'ich the sociaL partners werefree to set up in their  agreements;
negotiations on the retease of these aLlowances 1aeretriggered once the CpI ex-
ceecied certain threshotds. More recentLy even this  feature of semi-automatic
indexation  has been removed. In mi d-1976 the Government obtained the consent
of the TUC to Limit pay increases to 4 1/? per cent up to mid-1 g7T in return
for certain tax cuts and increased sociat aLtowances.CH/iPTER !I  79.
ENFORCING PPP IN THE EXCHANGE  |"IARKETS: A RULE FOR THE C0NVERGENCE
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OF INFLATION RATES AT A LOIi LEVEL
1. Monetary  PoLicy. and Elchange Rates
Currency exchange rates evoLve accordjnE to the evidence shown'
in Chapter I  so as to offset differences in nationaL infLation rates.
This relationship /iurchasing power par"i ty  QPil7 does not constitute  a .J
theory of exchange-rate  determination,  but rather a condition for  Long-run
equi Librium. Exchange rates, together w'ith prices, are joint Ly
determined by more fundamentaL factors, of which the domestic excess money
suppLy relative to imbaLances irr money inarkets abroacj L:Lays an essertial rcLe.
Price 'increases, required to cover inCreases in wageS that exceed
product'ivity gains, can materiaL'ize onLy through an accommodating monetary
expansion. Thus, a rnore or less f i rm control of the money stock by iEhe
monetary authorities heLps to determine expectations about the futurt:
evoLution of prices, and hence of the neaL rate of return on hoLdings
of cash baLances. Changes in.the expected reaL rate of return on a
country's money, in turn, determine its  exchange rate vis-d-vis foreign
moneys.
It  folLows that by controlLing the money stock, the authorities
indirectly controL the exchange rate, and vice-versa. Under a fixed
exchange-rate  system, for exampLe, the money stock Loses the charactr:r
of a policy instrument as the centraL bank is obLiged to buy and seLL
its  currency against foreign curr€ncies at g'iven rates.  0n the othen
hand, wjth a pureLy floating rate, the money stock would be the exogenous
variabte, and its  poL'icy controL wouLd determine the exchange rate, Siven
monetary policy in the rest of the wortd.
If  aLL wages and prices were set in competitive  markets, fuLL
employment  would be assured by the fLexibiLity of the wage and price
structure:  monetary poLicy (under fLoating exchange rates) or exchange-
rate poLicy (under fixed but adjustabLe rates) wouLd take the roLe
of determining  a given rate of infLation for each country reLative t'c
the rest of the worLd, In reality,  however, prices and wages are not
perfectly fLexible, so that a given money stock under fLoating exchange
rates (or a choice of an exchange rate under a fixed exchange-rate s;ystem)
does not ensure over the short run a desired value of the price LeveL
and of  its  rate of  change (the rate of  inflation).  Thus, in the short run
the pace of infLation, together with the LeveL of empLoyment, depend on
the price setting behavir:ur of trade unions and producers in the Labour
and product markets as u.ieLL as on how aLL economic operators ant'icipate
future changes in the pn'ice Levet. In this  situation,  controL of the  ./.80.
money stock under fLexibLe exchange rates may no Longer be sufficient
to ensure a predetermined  rate of infLation consistent with fuLL empLoyment.
. The feedback from exchange-rate changes [eads to cost increases wh'ich, if
vaLidated by monetary poLicy, give further impetus to the infLationary
mechanism, and possibIy Lead to a spiraL of ever increasing infLation.  WhiLe
it  is  cLear that this  mechanism can on[y continue so Long as monetary
poLicy is  accommodating, price and exchange,rate expectations ptay a
fundamenta[ roLe in this process and their  formation is unL'ikeLy to be
uniqueLy determined by monetary policy.
The danger of acceLerating'inftation in the system increases  nhen
the stronger chain of causaLity goes from exchange rates to prices, rather
than vice-versa. In fact,  it  may happen that, due to poLiticaL uncerta'inty
and big fLuctuations in expectations, Large and sudden fatIs  in exchange
rates which are not warranted by PPP couLd be quickLy vaLidated through the
'incorporation of higher infLationary expectations into new wage and price
setttements. In other words, excessive departures of exchange rates from PPP
may become seLf-fuLfiLLing, If  such a process develops, it  is  L'ikeLy that,
in orden to break the reverse cha'in of causat'ion, the authorities wiLl
introduce exchange controts and trade imped'iments.  They wiLL thus take the
road of protectionism and fjnanciaL disintegration.
Such an unsatisfactory  outcome couLd not occur if  a non-infLationary
incomes poLicy were coupted with a firm controL of money suppLy. This in
turn wouLd require contnoLLing  the government sector deficit  and that
part of  it  which is  financed through money creation. Thus quantitative ruLes
on money and credit suppty, though necessary. are not sufficient.  They
may not be credibLe, particularty when there are strong sociaL and poIiticaL
pressures for a vaIidating monetary policy.  In these cases/ quantity nuLes
for rnonetary poLicy shoutd be reinforced by ceiIings pLaced on government
expenditures and budget deficits;by guidetines on factor input remuneration
and' last but not Least, ruLes for managing the exchange rate.  In the course
of this  chapter a ruLe or rather a set of rules wiLL be put forward which
is aimed at reducing the extent to which potential[y destabiLizing
expectations operate in the foreign exchange market and foste.ring expectations
whi ch promote stabi I ity.rll
In the recent past there has been a graduaL shift in officiaL
thinking about the importance of announcing specific monetary targets.
Some central banks indeed have experimented with the setting of targets
for periods of up to a year ahead. However, sizable departures of exchange
rates from their PPP value typicalLy occur in the short run.  ExogenousLy
determined faLLs in the external value of a currency raise the prices
of imported inputs and the cost of Living, and these increases are quidcLy
incorporated into the wage and price setting mechanism. TraditionaL
guidetines for incomes policy do not he[p here, since the probLem is not
one of income distribution between wages and profits, but on the one hand
of income distribution between foreignersrand nationaLs and on the other
hand between the tradeabLe  and the non-tradeabte sector. t,'lhjLe this probLem
couLd be deaLt with by modyfying the automatic indexation mechanism bui[t
into cost of Living cLauses, its  infLationary potentiaL can be reduced
by smoothing short-run exchange rate-changes through some ruLes for managing
the foreign exchange markets.
CLearLy, any ruLe that requires centraL bank intervention  in
the foreign exchange market may come into confLict with the maintenance
of a money suppty target.  In fact, intervention on the foreign exchange
markets, unLess successfuLLy steritized, impLies a one to one creation
or destruction of domestic base money or centraL bank money. However,
whiLe the tvlo sets of rules viewed simultaneously appear contradictory,
often 'in a seguentiaI perspective they may reinforce each other.
2. ALternative GuideLines for Managing the Exchange Rate
The importance of this wider framework emphasises the urgency
of recent proposaLs for managing exchange rates; and the rest of this chapter
adds a proposaL of its own, This is that a country shouLd manage its
exchange rate so as to stabiLize the path of price inflation aLong the trend
impLied by its monetary poLicy, possibty aided by an incomes poticy.82.
Recent schemes do not seem to meet thi s guioing crincir: Le. Foi'
example, the IMF EuicieLines for f Loati nS l-tr5-7, a ririnor variant of which
has recent Ly be en endorsecl by the Cror,ter group /-23 -T rtoes not lreet i t.
Tire raairi eLements of this Last proposaL, neat Ly parapitrased by
0ort {-19-7 are that :
r'1.  A country should smooth out fLuctuations in the vaLue of its
exchange rate.  It  shoutd not normaLLy act agressively' i.e. it
shouLd not depress the rate when it  is faILing or push up the
rate when it  is rising.
2.  A country is aIlowed to act agressive[y if  in so doing it
brings its  exchange rate cLoser to a so-caLled "target zone of
rates", which it  has estabtished with the concurrence of the
Fund.
3.  The Fund wilI consult with a member-country  and chaLlenge
its policies when the exchange rate has moved outside what the
Fund considers a reasonabte range, to an extent that the Fund
considers LikeLy to be harmfu[ to the interests of members.
But a member would not be asked to hoLd any particutar rate
against strong market pressure."
The disadvantage of this Ii4F proposaL is that it  is too veouet
and as a resuLt Leaves f aritoo much to the cJi scnetion of the reLevarrt
authorities in interpreting the objectives. 0ort (sarne reference)has  pro-
posed a modification of the IMF guideLines in the foILowing direction :
-  the target zone is to be stated in terms of an effective
exchange rate;
-  the periodic, review of the "target zone" is  to be accompLished
according to a crawL'ing-peg formu[a (e.g. a moving average
over a specified period);
-  and the crawling-peg  formula can be aLtered by a "quaLified
majority decision."
t,JhiLe this proposaI woutd reduce the variation of exchange-rate
changes and the rate of infLation around their Long-run path/ it  couLd
not prevent the inevitabLe infLationary effects of exchange-rate dev'iations
from their impLied PPP vaIue.
In recent months the E C monetary Committee has been considering
a proposaI of the Dutch authorities (the "Duisenberg proposa[") to fix
non-binding "tanget zones" in terms of effective exchange nates either
for the f loat'ing currencies a[one or for aLt Community currencies.  These
target zones woutd serve initiaLLy onty as a trigger for consultation
at the Community leveL when market rates move outside tlreni. Accord'ing
to the proposaL, each country  would accept an obLigation to refrain
from intervention or other monetary  measures which wouLd dnive
its  effective exchange rate betow the target zone. 
t?
6.i.
WhiLe any attempt to put exchange-rate  poL'icy on the agenda of the
Community  must be wetcomed, the disadvantage of the Duisenberg proposaL in
its present form is that it  suffers from the same fundamentaL  weakness  as
the IMF guidelines namety, too much discretion is given to nationaL
authorities in setting their targets.
To summarize, existing proposats to restore more or Less orderLy
deveLopment in foreign exchange markets do not adequateLy tackLe the
centraL danger that transitory fLuctuations of exchange rates, outside
of theilimpLied PPP vaLues, can'initiate a process whereby the transitory
vatues of the exchange rate can become permanent.  '
A Proposat for a New Exchange-Rate  Agreement for the Eulopean CommunitY
An aLternative to the proposaLs which have been made so far would tre
a net"l agreement among EC members whereby exchange rates are managed in reLation to
reference rates which crawL on the basis of countries' retative performance  in
terms of their  whoLesaLe price indices.  The use of whoLesaLe prices here foL[ows
from the empiricaL resuLts presented in Chapter I.  The proposaL can be summarized
as foLtows :
(a) The reference rate for each country part'icipating in the arrangement
is defined irr terms of an effective exchange rate.  The reference
rate is  subsequentLy  expressed in units of  EUA for purposes of
standard measurement.
(b) An effective PPP index is  caLcuLated for  each participating country
by dividing its  whoLesaLe price index by a we'ighted average
of the whoLesaLe price indices of its  competitors, the weights
being the same as those entering into the fbrmuLa of its
effective exchange rate
(c) A country's reference rate is  changed periodicalLy (at  Least
quarterLy) in proportion to the change of a moving average of
its  effective PPP index.  The tength of the moving average and
the weights to be attached to the individuaL time eLements in  the
average would be the same for aLL countries in the arrangement.
(d) The authorities set marqins around the reference rate.84.
(e) At the beginning of each period (e.g. month, quarter) the
authorities ascertain,  on the basis of the computation described
in (b) and (c),  whether their  country's reference rate has
apprec'iated or deprec'iated reLative to the preceding year. In the
case of an apprec'iated currency the authorities intervene by
seLLing their  currency on the spot market if  the market rate tends
to exceed the [ower bound of the band. ConverseLy, in the case of
a depreciated currency the authorities intervene by buying their
currency on the spot market if  the market rate tends to exceed
the upper bound of the band.
(f)  The authorities do not steriLize the monetary counterpart of
their  foreign exchange interventions in the spot market'
(S) The mechanism of intervention and reserve borrowing curnentLy in
use among members of  FECQM would have to be extended in order to
make this  scheme operationaL. Borrowing countries are to pay
a oos'itive reaL rate of interest on outstanding Loans. Borrowing
privileges are reduced or compLete[y  aboLished in the case of
a country contravening  (e) and (f)-
(h) "snake" countries can keep their preSent arrangement  but at the
same t'ime wouLd need to coordinate their  economic poLicy so as
to progressiveLy  al"ign their  exchange rates to thei r  impL'ied
PPP vaLue.
ImpLementation  of the Scheme
Some comments on this proposaI are in order.
First,  concerning (a),  (b) and (c) it  shouLd be noted that the use
of country-specific effective exchange rates and effective PPP indices impLies
uniform and consistent intervent'ion. However, as is  shown in the Appendix
to this  chapterr'it does not enforce a correspondence between changes'in
biLateraL  exchange rates and in biLaterat PPP. NevertheLess, the Appendix
shouls that this  is not a drawback of the proposaL since, as llas demonstrated
'in Chapter I,  bi Lateral PPP performs statisticaLLy worse than muLti lateraL
(i.e.  effective) PPP. ALternatiVety, however, as is  shown in the same
Appendix, the scheme couLd aLso function by aLigning reference exchange r ates/
measured in a common basket numeraire (EUA)/to PPP indices based on the same
weighting scheme of the basket.
4.f5.
Second, neither the Length of the moving average nor the weights to
be given to each (quarterLy) eLement in the average, shouLd make the crawL'ing
parity undu[y sticky.  They shou[d simp[y smooth seasonaL and exceptionaL
elements that may otherwise push exchange rates away from their  recent trend.
For exampLe a four quarter moving average woutd have this effect.  The Length and
tlie tir,re d fte weiEt'fing scheme must be'identicaL for aLL participating  countries
to avoid the emergence of inconsistent referdbe rates.
Third, concerning (d) and (e), the proposaL envisages intervention, lf
any, in only one direction for a given currency during any given period.
ReLative[y depreciated  currencies are not permitted to depreciate by more than
the amount indicated by their purchasing power (pLus the margin), but
they are free to appreciate if  the market so indicates.  Conversety,  reLativeLy
appreciated currencies are not permitted to appreciate more, during any period,
than the amount implied by their purchasing power (pLus the margin), but they
can depreciate if  the market so indicates.  The rationale for th'is one-s'ided
intervention  scheme can easiLy be understood.
0nthe one hand, the scheme ajms at avoiding the buiLding up of
exchange-rate-wage-price  spirals that have been described in Section 1 of this
Chapter as possibLy Leading to hyperinfLation  or exchange and trade restrict'ions
in devaluing countries. It  does not aim, however, at frustrating market forces
where these enable a country to do better on tire exchange-raie front tlran is
indicated by its  past perforrnance  on the inftation  front.
0n the other hand, the scheme aims at avoiding too rapid appreciation
of strong member currencies, but aLLous them to appreciate by as much as
what seems granted by their past reLative price performance, when market
forces imply this resuLt.
These considerations can be iiLustrated r.rith the aid of graph 9
on which is pLotted on the vertica[ axis the country's index of effective
PPP- Higher vaLues of the index denote an inftation  rate higher at home than
in the rest of the worLd, and v'ice-versa- The intervention period are indicated
on the horizontal axis.  Assuming a four-quarter moving average and a quarterLy-
period'ic ruIe, the graph iLtustrates the case of country D having depreciated
in terms of  PPP by 10 % re[ative tp a year before and country A finding itseLf
in the opposite situation.  A band of +/-  1 per cent is atso assured. Currency D
can further depreciate in the exchange market during the first  fixed rate
intervent'ion period (fifth  quarter) up to a minimum vaLue of  11111, at ro1hich
point the centraL bank wiLL start buying it.  If  D were to appneciate along the
path marked by D'D" the central bank wiL[ fottow a',hands-off" poLicy.  A9A
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simiLar argument, but in the opposite direction, appLies totre appreciated
currency A. TheoreticatIy,  it  couId happen that A depreciates in the market
.during a given intervention period by such an amount that it  becomes "de facto"
a depreciated currency, (the line A-A "crosses the "time" axis). This, however,
is un[ikeLy and to make it  even Less likety  the proposat envisages that
whether a currency has appreciated or depreciated in a particuLar time period
be computed with respect to the change in the PPP from the same period
of the preceding year.
0n the whoLe, the scheme puts the emphasis on stabiLizing expectations
in the exchange markets and on [essening the disparity of infLation rates
among member countries. Such a goaL, howeven, is not sought through the
imposition of a straitjacket in the form of shrinking margins of fLuctuation'
Inf[ation rates wi[[  continue to diverge so long as member countries do not
harmonize their  incomes and monetary poLic'ies. The proposaL only aims at
preventing inflat'ion rates from diverging even more as the consequence  of
disturbances in the foreign exchange markets. The scheme in no way impLies
that Low-infLation countries wouLd be induced to raise their  infLation rate.
Fourth, to appreciate the importance of (f)  the proposaL shouLd be
seen as a supplement to monetary poLicy. To see it  otherwise would be to
commit the error of expecting ruLes governing exchange rates to produce
results wh'ich can onIy be obtained by nrore fundamentaL poLicies.  To cLarify,
consider the foLlowing exampLe. Assume that a yearLy money suppLy target is
set at a 5 7. growth leveL. It  may stiLL happen that the target is temporariLy
overshot and that this or other exogenous factors push the exchange rate
upward (a devaluation) during a quarter.  Intervention to slow such a movement
wiLL require destruction of base money at a rate that may restore the growth
of money supply to the target or temporari[y reduce it  below 5 Z,  0yer the
whoLe year, however, if  the exchange rate is  smoothed on the PPP path impIied
by the yearLy target for money suppLy, the foreign exchange intervention should
be ni[;  so that the evo[ution of the exchange rate woutd indeed be determined
by the target of money suppLy relative to the demand for it.
0n the other hand, if  the smootring ruLe on foreign exchanges  were
not foItowed, the excessive departure of the exchange rate from the PPP trend
that is  impL'ied by the year^Ly target for money suppLy may feed back into prices
and wages to such an extent that the authoritiesr capacity to keep to the yearly
money suppLy target may Lose credibiLity.  In fact,  abiding by the money suppLy
rule in the face of the unexpected infLationary push ('imptied by the unexpected
devaIuation) means a rnore stringent credit squeeze and/or a reduction of
the centraL bankrs wiLL'ingness to finance the government deficit,  either and
both of which may be poLiticaLLy  unacceptabLe.68.
Since money suppLy targets are difficuLt  to enforce on a short-term
basis, temporary deviations from the target may be reftected in unexpected
changes in the exchange rate, which, if  aLlowed to manifest themseLves and be
transmitted into price expectations,  may make it  more difficuLt  for the
authorities to stick to their  preannounced money suppLy target.  By requiring
the authorities to smooth the excessive depreciation of a devaLued currency
(or,  tess Iikety in this  examp[e, the excessive appreciation  of a revaLued
currency), the scheme a$ proposed here puts a brake on their  abnormaL money
creation,  It  thus constitutes a buiLt-in stabitizer for the short-term conduct
of th€ir monetary poLicy.
It  may weLL happen that the authorities lrongLy estimate the
variabtes on which they base their  money supply target.  For exampte, the
demand for a money whose currency anea tends to increase (e.g. the Dlvl) may
be underestimated  by the authorities suppLying that money (e.g. the Bundesbank).
As a resuLt, their  money suppLy target may turn out to be deftationary and tend
to provoke an unexpected (on the basis of past infLation performance) appreciation
of their currency. By requ'iring them to intervene in order to sLow down the
appreciation of their  currency, the scheme here proposed wouLd in this  case
compeL the authorities to create more of their  currency (which they setl  against
foreign exchange) than they had ptanned on the basis of their  estimates -
which is  indeed what is  required, given the unexpectedLy Larger demand for their
money. Thus, again, the scheme provides a buiLt-in stabiLizer which, in this
case takes the form of correcting inaccurateLy  set targets, rather than the short-
term adaptation of actuaL quantities to correctLy set targets (as was the case
in the previous exampLe).
CLearty, the stabiLizing features of this  scheme have aLso some
drawbacks.  |l.lhi[e on the whoLe the scheme has the advantage of making it
difficuLt  for devaIuin9 countries to acceterate their, money suppLy too rapidLy,
on the other hand it  makes it  difficul,t  for  revd.ring countries to deceIerate
their  money suppty too rapidty.  In other wordsn as already pointed out, the
scheme puts a premium on monetary convergence. However, the practicaL signifi-
cance of this difficu[ty  shouLd not be exaggerated especiaLLy if  aLLowance is
made for (i)  the moderate length of the moving average (a year)r(ii)  the frequent89.
periodicity 'in resetting the refsrence rates (every quarter or month) and
(iii)  the margins appLied to the reference rate.  As an exampLe, with a
periodicity of one month and a margin of +/- 1'l  an appreciating country  can
nevatue by more than the sum of its  reference rate and the margin through
the defLationary impact that Lower traded goods prices have on the PPP itself
and, thus, uLtimateLy  on future reference rates.  CLearLy, this process can
be cumulative.
In conc[usion, how effective constraints wiLL be depends,  among
other things, on ('i) the width of the margin beyond the crawLing parity;
(ii)  the Length and weights of the moving average formuLa; (i'ii)  the
periodicity of the crawl; (iv)  the lags between money and prices; (v) and
whether expectations in foreign exchange markets are formed more on the basis
of adaptive processes or of rationat behaviour. In particuLar, the way
expectations are formed is  cruciaL in reconciLing the use of the proposal
with a market system.
Consider the case of expectations formed different(y by specuLators
and centraL banks. If,  for exampLe, specuLators  expect a Lower infLation
rate than that envisaged by the centraL bank, there wiLL be a tendency
for the deprec'iated currency to appreciate. Sticking to the ruLe wouLd
impty a higher inflow of reserves, a faster growth of the money supp[y and
an infLation rate higher than originail.y estimated by speculators. It  is
obvious then in this  case the authorities must Let the market soLution prevaiL.
0n the other hand, if  specualtors expect a 10 "/" rate of
infLation and the central bank sets a target af 8 %, then according to the
rule the centraL bank wiLL be forced to buy its  own money which wiLL bring
the money supply and, conseguent[y, the rate of inftation  down to the lower
Leve[. In this  case the rule forces a "good" solution.  The guiding principLe
is that the ruLe is operationaL for reLativeLy depreciated currencies when
the exchange rate runs through the fLoor; it  is not operationat  when the
exchange rate runs tlirough the ceiL'ing. The converse is true for  retativeLy
appreciated currencies.
Fifth,  w'ith respect to (g), the danger of excessive use of
resources  shouLd not be exaggerated.  From the empirical anatysis in
it  appears that the currencies of the U.K. and ltaLy are at present
probably undervaLued on the basis of their  purchasing power. Since
is'not required to realign initial.  neference rates on the basis of
teveL of absoLute purchasing polder, but simpLy to crawL frorn those
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rates on the basis of changes in purchas'ing power from the in'itiaL period, it
is not to be expected that the weak currencies -  if  indeed currentLy underva[ued
uiLL put too much pressure on the uorking of the scheme. Nor, for that matter,
is the converse to be expected for strong currencies, if  -  as it  appears at
present- they are overvaLued in terms of purchasing power.
Despite the beLief that the use of  FEC0M resources requ'ired to
sustain the proposed scheme t.loul.dftdeed be modest - particutar[y as the
exchange markets become famiLiar with the operating methods of the proposaL
and incorporate them in the formation of expectations -  it  is  recognized that
the initiaL  scepticism of the countries who see themselves as LikeLy creditors
w'iLI be  considerab[e. To overcome this  understandabLe  att'itude we want
to undertine two possibIe suppLementany features of the proposaLs :  (i)  It  wouLd
be expedient to begin with reLativeLy wide margins around the parit'iesn  thus
Iimiting the need for  interventions; margins coutd be narrowed substantiaLLy
after an initial  period of,  say, one year.  When the system has reached normal
operationrmargins  shouLd be narrow enough to make effective the automat'ic
corrective  pressures which the scheme is  designed to introduce on domestic
monetary management. (ii)  t,'lhiLe it  is essentiaI that the scale of  Lending
faciLities be adequate to strenghten the credibility  of the reference rate
structure, automatic drawings wouLd be repayabLe over a short period, as is
present[y the case in  FECOM; to the extent that drawingscouLd onLy be repaid
by mobi l'izing short and medium-term credit faci Lit'ies, access to the Latter
woutd, as is  already the case in the Community, be conditionat on the borrower's
comptiance with coLLective[y agreed standarci of behaviour -  in the proposed
scheme points (e) and (f)  on intervention rutes and absence of steriIization
respect i ve Ly.
Since the reference rates in the proposed scheme are formuLated
in effective rate terms, the choice of the medium of intervention is  Left open.
The nationaL monetary authorities in their  concented intervent'ions may choose
to defend a particuLar reference rate by intervening in one or more Community
currencies or in doLlars; and the choice wiLL no doubt vary from time to time.
Ctaims and debts arising out of interventions shouLd be denominated in  European
Units of Account (as is the case for the reference rates); this  wiLL spread
exchange risks more fairty  than in the present FECOM ruLes where they are
assumed by the debtors. But it  is  necatLed that borrowersr  shouLd be charged
a positive reaI interest rate on their  drawings.91.
This proposaL for exchange-rate  management has been inspired by
the experiences of 1976 for the indjviduaLLy fLoating currencies. At
first  no changes were envisaged in the management of the five Community
currencies which (together with two non-Community  currencies) constitute
the snake. It  is obvious, however, that adoption of the proposed scheme
wouId present probLerns for the snake currencies,
First, enforcing  PPP on the non-snake currencies wouLd raise
the question why it  should not aLso be enforced on the others. As it
emerges from Chapter I  some snake currencies were overvatued in a PPP-
perspective and this overvaLuation was certain[y one of the factors which
prompted the October 1976 reaLignment in the snake. if  it  is recognized
that countries within the snake do not meet the requirements for maintaining
fixed nominat rates bilateraLLy, i.e. their infLation trends are not paraLLeL
and their monetary poIicies are not coordinated,wouLd  it  not appear togicat
by the same principLe to apply the proposaL for the individuaLLy  fLoating
currencies to the snake ?
Second, preserving the snake creates technicaL probLems in managing
the PPP-ruLe,  when the interventions to operate the ruLe take place in
snake currencies. No consideration is given here as to how such probLems
coutd be overcome, e.S. by the snake as a whote fo[louing a PPP-rule based
on the average performance of the memberst infLation and excha6rge rates, or
by the simpte aLternative of tetting the dominant snake currency, the DM
observe the PPP rule, and the othen snake countries continuing to
observe fixed DM intervention Limits. NevertheLess, it  is obvious that the
technical prob[ems  wouLd be easier ff  each snake currency were managed
according to the PPP-rute - a symrnetry of treatment which wouLd no doubt be
suggested'in  preparatory negotiations by the countries now fLoating
jndividuaI ly.
The abandonment of the present snake is not proposed here for it
wouLd be inconsistent with the aim of breaking the vicious circLe of
depreciation  and inflation so as uttimateLy to stabitize nominaL  exchange
rates and harmonize nationaL inftation rates at a Low LeveL. To propose
the discontinuation of the one remaining eLement of monetary cooperation
in the Community which expticitty shares this aim -  though the associated
efforts so far have not been impressive - is not the intention. l,levertheLess,
the proposed rule cannot avoid drawing attention to the inadequacy of the snake92.
arrangements. If  it  can thereby heLp to push the constituents towards firmer
coordination, so much the better; if  it  cannot and the snake proves to be onLy
partLy viabLe, the sma[ten currencies have in the proposed PPP-ruLe a more
attractive alternative than individuat fLoating.
In concLusion, it  shouLd be emphasized again that not too much shouLd
be ctaimed for this  management scheme. It  is essentiaLty a scheme for
converting the European system of exchange rates into a "reaL snake" rather
than a "nominaL snake", a terminoLogy  He or'Je to s-c '  Ko[m' uho in a perceptive
short. article  outLined the main features of the proposeci interventicn systeiit
/_'16-7. The scheme recognizes the unfortunate fact that infLationary
propensities differ  in the member countries. Differences in infLation rates
are mainly nomina[ and the smaLL Oartrit  anyrdue to real terms of trade changes
couLd be accommodated  through structuraL readjustments of the economies of
therpmber states.  The scheme outtined here emphasizes the predominantLy
nominaI character of these divergent infLation rates and it  aILows exchange
rates to offset no more than differences 'in infLation trends.
Recognition of the fact that inf[ation  rates differ  is both  the
strength and the weakness of the scheme. It  constitutes'its t.reakness, because
it  means that the scheme cannot contribute in a major way to the harrnonization
of inflation  rates in the Community at a Low LeveL, unless member countries
coordinate their  incomes and monetary poLicies.  It  constitutes its  strength,
because it  means that -  contrary to the snake arrangement -  th'is scheme cannot
be endangered by a persistent divergence between member countries' monetary
and incomes poticies.93.
APPENDIX -  RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN  THE REFERENCE RATE, BILATEMT  AND
MULTILATEML  PURCHASING  POb,ER  PARITY
We define r-D as the reference exchange rate betrreen currency i  and a
Ll1
given num6raire, E.
The determination of the percentage changes in the reference rate (ii'),
in general, is
i.-  = fl. - I  oo IIo.  (1) ].UtKr\l\
where K = aLI partjcipating countries
II-. = the average inflation rate in counEry i  over the relevant period
I-
o,- = weights relevant t.o all  participating countries K
f,0",=  I
l\
K
Expression (l)  is general and does not imply a particular weighting pro-
cedure.
A. The Cas-e of Non-Country ,sp.ecific Weights
A parti cular we'ightingr scheme would use the same set of weiglrts f or aL I
participating countries. This is  the case, for  exampte, of the weights
adopted in a basket formula like  the European unit of Accounr (EUA).
It  would thus be expedient to define o,K as equal to the weights in the
EUA as well as choosing E = EUA.
of course, anY other uniquely (i.e.  non-country specific) unit of account,
'  say the SDR, would do as well from this point of view.  Indeed, a broader
numdraire, like  the SDR, vould be preferable if  the crawling reference
rafe arrangement  were to be adopted by a wider group of count,ries than
the E.C. members. The adoption of a narrov/er num6raire such as Ehe EUA,
would imply for the members of the agreement, that some coiltnon exchange
rate policy should be agreed upon vis-i-vis  the currencies not ineluded
in the EUA basket.One form in which this problem has already been discussed is the issue
of the European level of the dollar, but it  obviously also applies to
any other currency outside the arrangement.  The necessity of a nego-
tiated connnon exchange rate policy vis-i-vis  outside currencies arises
from che fact that their  importance is obviously not the same for all
che rnembers in the agreement (e.g. Ehe exchange rate of the US dol1ar,
from, a trade weighted point of view, is more important for the lira  or
t,he pound, than for the Belgian franc or the guilder).  In order to re-
duce the Likelihood of conflicts and stresses, it  would perhaps be pre-
ferabLe that the conmon exchange rate policy vis-d-vis major outside
currencies, ljke  the dollar or the yen, be also based on the same
purchasing power formula as the one adopted within the common European
arrangement. This could be obtained by requiring from the authorities
of any one country in the agreement that they fix  their crawling refe-
rence rate vis-i-vis  the dolLar (the yen, etc.) on the basis of their
bilateral  purchasing power as defined above. AlternativeLy, this aspect
of the joint  exchange rate policy could be entrusted to the authorities
managing the FECOM.
Using (l)  the percentage  change in the reference rate for country j  is
i,-  = II. -  Ia,, fi,,  Q) Je  J  K o  K
K = aLI participating  countries
Substracting (?) from (1) t,le obtain :
i.-  -  ir-  = II. - II, = i,,  for all  i  # ].E  Jll  1  J  1l
1
J (3)
which says that currencies i  and j  move in proportion to the difference
in the percentage  change of their averege inflacion rates.
As to the intervention procedure, the authorities of country i  can either
intervene in all  exchange  markets or, more ginply, restrict  cheir trans-
actions in one market. The first  procedure implies that the authoritiesl
target be (3); the second procedure, although technically much simpLer,
irnplies a set of targets which can be quantified through an elaborate
cal-culat,ion. This can be ehown as follows.  By definition,n
i.-  =  [  q., ;
i.E  K 'iK
l\=l
By combinitg ( I ) and (4) one obcains
I'r
II,. -  Iuo' IIo
^  K't
Taking currency I to be the intervention currency, we
Io*(iil * i,*) = [r - 
i"* 
fi*  for i=2,3,..,,r1
= l, nr.j  0 for
in n-l  unknovms
1K
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(4)
(s)
can rewrite (5)
(6)
i  = j  and r.:  = -r:j  (6) is a system -  lJ  Jl
(the eross rates) whose sol"ution is
ry authorities must possess
formuLa. It  is impLicit in
behave passively.
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l- l:ll Irl
L -a2 -03 rr-o"J 
L
the necessary knowledge moneta
PP in terms of a common basket
etary authorities of country I
Tr -to* n*l
:  |  (7)
n" -rr* n*J
(7)
B. The Case of Counrry-specific  I^Ieights
It  has beerr seen  that the use of non-country-specific weights
compels bilateral  reference rates (rij)  to move in accordance with bi-
LateraL PPP. This feature is a weakness of case A to the extent that the empirid.
evidence presented in Chapter I  shows that biLateral PPP does no! conform
to bilateral  exchange rates as well as effective PPP to effective ex*
change rates.  our proposal, therefore, is based on country specific
weights. Formulae (l)  and (2) become respectively
Noting that  lo,o
K"
of n-l  equations
given by
tzr
r
nt
and becomes
to  enforce P
that  the mon?6"
f ,- * II, - rcr) n.,  (s)
Li-!  r  KK 
K
i.-, = n. - roi" n..  {9) .lr'  J  K o  K
where tig  = an ef fective  exchange rate  alrtrough expressed in ;r numeir:aire.
cti  = any weighcing scheme so long as it  is  specific  to  count-ry i
ancl provided Io,) *  1,  These are rhe same weights which de- - 
K[.
fine  the effective  exchange rate
Subtracting (9) from (8) we obtain
i  ,  =I1,.*II.-ltc]..*i)n*  (lo) 'il]  L3g^'rri  "j  ; 
t**  *K'"K 
'v,
Acclnpilrisr:nof(3)with(l0)revea1st1ratthedifferencebetweenthe
pc]'centage change of  the two effective  reference rates  is  not equal to
the difference  of  the average races of  inflation  in  che rwo counrries.
Siniilarly,  tire percentage  change in  the bilateral  cross rate,  say fij,
wi1.l not be equal to  the difference  of  the rate6 of  inflaci,on  in  countries
i  aud j.  This can be sinply  demonstrated by first  defining  the percen*
i:age change in  rhe effective  exchange rates  for  i  and j  :
ii r,-  =  I  o-  t.-,+  o,i i..  (ll) rr,K#jKr-KJr.J
f,-=  r  crl,t,,,+oj*.,  (\z)
Jr  vJ:  K  .l K  r  J} Ar  r.
Noring that  i..,  *  -i'r-  when initial  values of  the exc.hange rates are -  IJ  Jl
set equal to uniry,  subtraeting (12) frou  (ll)  ana substiruting  for
i*,,  *  i .,- the R.Ii" S. of  ( l0)  we obtain tL!  I 1,,
-  ,  1.  1.--  .-  l i..=-*-r-j-"-:  [il;*n.*f  (a,-o*)Ii,-  I  "faiif. lJ  (ry1 *o'l)  I  J  K  K  K'K  K+j
l1
+ r  oJ. l.  r a.,.  r(  rKr  forall  il  j  (13)
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'which shows that generally i=  cannot be equal to II-. -  JI, .  As a check lJ'lJ
the reader can verify that when the weights are not country specific,
i.e.  the superscript i  is set equal to the superscript j,  iij  = fii - flj.
the intervention  procedure,  consider again that all  countries
te transactions only in the market for currency l.  By combi-
nd (ll)  and following the same reasoning underlying (6) we
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C. ?he intervenEion  mechanism when some currencies do not follow a PPP
ru].e.
In this section we take up the issue of how t.o introduce a PPP rule for
the non-snake E.C.-countries  without altering the present snake mechanism.
It  is iurnediately evidenc that the snake cannot survive if  the eountries
that fo1low the PPP rule intervene in alL exchange markets for their
currency so as to ensure bilateral  PPP. To take an example suppose Italy
enforces bilateral PPP. This implies that  :
iIB=[f-fiS
and
iru=[r-["
where, IrBrH stand for ltaly,  Belgium and Holland.
( l5)
( l6)From (15) and (15)
i-vis  the guilder
the rate  of  change
can be derived :
9a.
of  the exchange rate  of  the BF vis-
(r7)
BF and the guilder  cannot be
enforced by a multicurrency
the existence of  the snake
( tB)
the intervention currency
equation (6) holds.  It
for i  = s*lr . rD  (19)
r  =r  +i  =TT -TT -BH  -BI  -IH  ..B  ,.H
This means Ehat a fixed  rate  between Ehe
maintained.  We conclude that  a PPP rule
inEervention system is  incompatible  with
mechanism.
i.e.  the exchange rate of currency i  vis-E-vis
remains unchanged. For the non-snake countries
can be rewritten as
This problem can be solved if  the auchorities enforce the PPP rule by
intervening in one of the eurrencies of the snake. This can be shown as
follows (for the case of the PPP rule baaed on the EUA). Let there be
s snake counlries and (n-s) non-snake eountries. The latter  follow the
PPP rule.
We then have for  the snake countries
i..  = Q 1t fori-2r...rs
lo*n*
Substi.tuting (lB) into (19) and solving for r.l(i  = s*1r...,n)  yields
r,,
ll loo i*, = [i -
l-+-l-  ,
l-s+l,ll  lt-qs+l  ""'  -cr;l
i:ft:t l:l=l:l tttl
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A similar expression can be obtained if  t
terms of effective exchange rates.
This intervention mechanism implies that
of the snake currencies is not under the
Ehese countries.
['".r t:
Ln"
he PPP
- ro" nil
- '"- 'J
(20)
rule is  expressed in
the effeccive  exchange rates
control  of  the authorities  of99.
CH4)TER rrI
THE ATTRACTIVENESS OF A EUROPEAN  PARALLEL CURRENCY
The 0PTICA t75 Report advocated the creation of a European paraLteI
currency (EPC) with a vieu to stepping up progress towards European monetary
unification:
"As regards economic efficiency the (next) best step would be a
fuil.y-indexed  European paraLlet currency; but the OPTICA  group
has atso taken into account the poLiticaL feasibiLity of such
a proposaI because the governments  concerned have European and
nationaL aims: thus, if  nationaL aims - which may, even for some
time, remain the dominant force - are not taken into account,
any proposaL for European monetary unification hroutd meet strong
poLiticaL opposition". /  6,  p" 4.-7.
This reasoning Led the OPTICA'75 Report to advocate partiaL indexation
of the EPC, to be more precise, making the EPC as effective, in the long term
as the most stabLe nationaL currency. The EPC maintains its vaLue in terms
of either the currency suffering the least marked erosion of internaL purchasing
power or the currency depreciating [east against the other currencies. It  was
also suggested that it  wouLd be usefut to have a cLoser understanding of the
way in which such a paraLLeL currency might function in its various formuLations
and to carry out simutation exercises in respict of past devetopments. At the
same time, these simuLations shouLd shed more Ii9ht on the possibIe attractive-
ness of a paraLLeL currency and hence its  LikeLy speed of penetration. The
discussions prompted by pubLication of a Manifesto in The Economis! by nine
European economists /  B -7 and of OPTICA?5  appear to have focussed on the last
point'in particuIar. sorne poticy makers fear undu[y keen competition and too
speedy an introduction of the paraLlet currency, particuLarLy in the form
advocated in the Manifesto which in their view t"toutd undermine nationaL
monetary sovereignty too swiftLy, whiLst other take the view that the nationat
currencies shouLd be napid[y reptaced by an Epc (in this case the term
parallet wouLd not be re[evant for very Long). This is the reason for  :
d'iscussing, after a numlcer of sir,iuIations on the functiorrir.lg of the
EPC, the speeci of acceptance of the Epc in section z. rn section j
the probLem of possibLe competition between the EPC and other internationaI
currencies such as the Euro-dottar is considered.1 00.
1. Simulations of the Functioning of the European  ParatLeL Currency
The simulations cover the period 1967-75. Consistent series are readiLy
avaiLable for aLL the countries from 1963 onwards; but for weighting purposes
five-year averages for a number of variabLes were necessary' Hence, 1967
had to be taken as the starting date for the exercise.
Some of the technicaL and statisticaL options open are expLained in
Annex III-A.  For the time being, the weights used for each country in the
study of the EPC have been calcuLated on the basis of the average of the GNP
vaLues for the five years prior to that for which the vaLue of the EPC is
caLcuLated.  These weights are therefore variabLe and can be justified  on
the foILowing grounds :
- the composite structure of the EPC needs to be adjusted in line with
changes over time in the different GNPs;
- entry of new member countries must be taken into account, In turn,
this necessitates a redefinition of the EPC based on the GNP vatues
as of the date of entry. It  is better, therefore, for the weights
to be changed graduaLLY;
- the riskd havhg a "disequ'iLibrium"  exchange rate in the base year
is considerabLy Lessened using the above procedure-
The consumer price index and the wholesaLe price index have been used
as aLternative measures to defLate nominaL seri",  1),  The sinruLations, wh'ich
are presented beLow, compare the yieLd of an investment denominated  in  EPC
t,rith that of an investment denominated in French francs.  The French franc has
been chosen because it  occupies a position midway between the strongest and the
weakest currencies in the Community. It  is,  of course, easy to switch from
the exchange rate of the EPC against the French franc to the exchange rate of
the EPC against another currency by resorting to the appropriate cross rate.
(1) See Chapter I  and Annex I-A thereto for  a
empirical assessment of the choice of the
of a currencyrs purchasing power.
.t.
theoreticaL discussion  and an
different indices as a measure101 .
4a FuLt Indexation of the EPC
The formuLa for catcuLatinq  a fuLLy-indexed  paraLLeL currency is
a.
'l
r.
I
(1 +Jr.)
t
where a. represents the weight of currency
I
currency i  and a reference currencyr and I(
country i.
i,  r. the exchange rate between
. is the rate of inftation in I
Use-gl-!e!s!ret-ft tss!
Graph 10 gives clianges in the price of the EpC in
terms of the French franc and changes in the price of the DM in terms of the
French franc between 1967 and 1975. As could be expected, the EPC, if  it  had
existed, would have been a better store of va[ue than the DM and a fortiori  the
FF particuLarLy in the most inflationary period 1972-75. The gap between
the two curves measures the gain'in purchasing power made possib[e by hoLding
futLy-indexed EPCs as opposed to olts.
It  wiLL also be noted that the purchas'ing-power protection afforded by
the fuffy-indexed EPC to, say, a Frenchman, is very similar to the protection
he would obtain with a currency indexed so[eLy to the French consumer price
index, a fact which constitutes a substantiation of the purchasing  poh,er parity
theory. For instance, between January 1967 and December 1975, consumer pri ces
in France rose by 88.31 il  and the exchange rate between the fuL[y-indexed EpC
and the franc by 94.29 %.
Use of trJho lesa Le pr i ces
6raph
fo L Lows that
44 tl
of
shows that the trend of the Epc indexed to whoLesaLe prices closeLy
the EPC indexed to consumer prices.10?.
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1.2. Semi-Indexation of the EPC (OPTICA '75t
The 0PTICA r75 report proposed a  EPC which woutd move in Line uith
the "best" European currency, and, in turn, tllo cLose[y retated formutae were
suggested: (i)  Linking the EPC with the currency of the country w'ith the
[owest infLation rate; (ii)  tinking the EPC with the nationaL currency
that has depreciated teast or appreciated most since the base period. It  is
obvious that in the Long term, the same currency wiIL normat[y be the reference
cufrency for the EPC in both alternatives. Yet, it  may happen that, during
certain periods, a different reference currency wiLI prevaiI according to
the chosen criterion.
ti) l!s-!e!es!-i!!!e!!gn-re!s
Graph 12 shows that the consumer price index in Germany was
consistentty Lower than that in the other countries of the
Community during the period under investigation. The exchange
rate between the EPC and each of the Community currencies other than
the DM woutd, therefore, have followed exactLy the same course as
the exchange rate between the DM and these currencies.
The same is true if  whotesale prices are used (Graph 13).
(i i) lhe_leggs!_re!e_eI_dsprsslslje!
Graph 14 shows that aLl. the currencies depreciated against the DM
in the period 1967'75. Once again, the exchange rate between the
EPC and the currencies other than the DM wouLd have moved in the
same way as the exchange rate between these currencies  and the DM.
sLightLy different resu[ts might have been obtained using other indices
or other time periods. For instance, if  1970 and not 1967 were taken as the
base year and using the urhotesaLe price index, then the "best" currency wou[d
have been the FB from June 1970 to August 19?3, the DM from 0ctober 1973 to
October 1974 and the FB after November 1974. Graph 15 shows how the price
of the EPC in terms of both the FB and the Dfil woutd have fLuctuated,tu) ,
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1.3. Assessment of the Competitiveness of the EPC
If  the competitiveness of the EPC vis-A-vis the nationaL currencies
and hence its speed of acceptance is to be assessed, then some idea of the
gain - equivaLent to an interest rate - which can be made in a g'iven period
by hoLd'ing EPC as opposed to a nationaL currency or a security denominated
in nationaL currency is needed. Therefore, the percentage change in the
vaLue of the epc (in both the fuLLy-indexed and partiaLLy-indexed
formuLations)  between month k in a given yeaf m and the same month in the
foLLowing year m + 1 in terms of currency i,  were caLcuLated. In order
to compete with the EPC, cu!.rency i  wou[d have had to carry an interest
rate equal to the rate of change of the cPr. The rate of change in the
vatue of the EPC in terms of francs between (k, m) and (k t  ffi * 1) corresponds
to the interest rate which wou[d be needed for an individual not to show
any preference for either EPC or securities denominated in francs, under the
assumption of perfect forecasting.
Graph 16 and 17 give the resuLts of the above caLcuLations for the
period 1967-75 in respect of a fuLLy-indexed EPC and a semi-indexed EPC.
The point on curve (I)  corresponding to January 1970, for instance,
represents the interest rate which wouLd have had to be paid on a deposit
denominated in francs hetd from January 1970 to January 1971 if  the franc
were to compete with the EPC.
In Graphs 16 and 17, the interest rate on French bonds (curve II)  )
is representative of the yieLd obtainable on a one-year investment
denominated in FF. By taking the difference between the average yieLd or
bonds and that on a Liquid investment in EPC, it  was possibLe to work out
what the corresponding rate of interest on a one-year investment in EPC wouLd
have had to be for the EPC to offer a yieLd equaL to that accruing from an
investment in francs.
._t .ttu.
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It  is aLso clear that the EPC wouLd have a forward exchange rate
which wouLd guarantee its  competitiveness v'is-A-vis investments in nat'ional
currency and would probabLy even out the fLuctuations in its value compared
with these of the nationaL currencies. This wouLd reduce the risk invoLved
in ho[ding  EPC.
Graphs 16 and 17 show that the  EPCrs potentiaL annual yietd is
extremeLy voLatiLe, this being true of both the fuLLy-indexed  and the
semi-indexed  EPC, but more so for the [atter.  At certain moments in time -
1969 and 1973 - the EPC, whether fut[y-indexed or semi-indexed, offered an
absoLuteLy  unrivatted annuaL yieLd of over ?0'1. However, it  also often
happens, even in the case of the fuLLy-indexed EPC, that the yieLd is [ower
than the French interest rate on bonds, But cLearLy, if  interest were paid on
the EPC, this wouLd atter the situation. At times, the yield of the semi-
indexed EPC woutd have been heaviLy negative, and hence short-term investments
in francs wouLd have been more attractive.
1.4. ConcLusions  concerning the Simutations
No generaL Lessons concerning the working of a European paratLeL
currency can be drawn from the above simuLations. This is so because they
covef onLy a specific period; use specific methods of caIcuIation (cf. Annex
III-a);  and onLy analyse reLationships between the EPC and the DM and the
EPC and the FF. The reLative advantage enjoyed by the EPC over the
nationaL currencies wouLd ctearty be greater in the case of the currencies
the DM value of which had depreciated at a more rapid rate than the DM value
of FF, provided these discrepancies had not been offset by a higher nominaL
interest rate.
The simuLations show that the ful[y-indexed EPC affords the greatest
protection. Its appreciation against the FF cLoseLy corresponds to the
infLation rate recorded in France during the same period, thereby substantia-
t'ing indirectLy the purchasing pohrer parity theory. Moreover, changes in
the value of the EPC in FF foLLow quite a regutar pattern (Graphs 10,11)
t"tith the yieLd fIuctuating (Graph 16).
The infIat'ion-pro6fing offered by the different versions of the EPC
advocated in the 0PTiCA'75 report is cLearly a good deaL Less efifective.
In these versjons the EPC wouLd probabLy fluctuate more widety than the fuLLy-
indexed EPC : the exchange fLuctuations for the different currencies  against
the DM g'iven in Graph 14 gfve a good idea of its variabitity.113.
However, a comparative study of the short-term interest rate and the
.  one-year premium offered by the EPC reveats that,, cotnpared with short-term
investments in nationaL currency (in French francs at any rate), the
EPC is Less attractive than might have been imagined. Moreover, the
variab[e nature of the yield means that the hoLding of the various
forms of EPC is not free of short-term risk, the yietds possibty being
atso negative. Indeed the risk is greater than that involved in hoLding
assets of a singLe maturity denominated in nationaL currency.
In our view, however, one must be careful not to jump to the conclusion
that the EPC woutd be an unsuitable reserve asset simpLy because its  vaLue
in terms of nationaL currency ftuctuates. In fact, as was pointed out
earlier, if  the EPC were to be introduced, a forward market woutd probably
dampen down such fLuctuations.
Furthermore, the variable value of the EPC in terms of any singte national
currency is of significance only where the hotder of EPC is mainLy a
net borrower or lender in nationat currencies. But, if  at a future date
the EPC were to have LargeLy ousted the nationaI currencies,  every
transactor wouLd be mainLy a borrower or Lender of EPC (and would have
no'open'positions in nationaL currencies),  and hence the stabiLity of
the EPC's purchasing power wou[d be fuLLy assured. At that stage, it
wouLd be the vaLue of the nationaL currencies that woutd be fLuctuating
against the EPC and, consequenttyr'invoLving a high degree of risk.  Thus,
changes in the vaLue of the EPC in terms of national currency ought not
to be used as a criticism against the EPC as a store of vaLue, but simpLy
as an argument for those who feeL that the EPC needs to be "subsidized"
during its "running-in" period to facititate its  acceptance.
2, The Speed of Introduction of the European ParalLeI Currency
The preceding simuLations go some way towards resoLving the question of
the speed at which the European parallet currency coutd repLace the
nationaL currenciesrsince they give an idea of the potentiaL gain that
holders of that currency wouLd reap as compared uith hoLders of other
currencies or securities  denominated in other currencies.
.l .114.
2.1. Attractiveness of Securities  Denominated  in EPC
The fears voiced concerning the 'issuing of EPC denominated securities would
seem to be exqggerated. Some poticy makers feeI that the advantage of the
EPC, particuLan[y the fuLLy-indexed one, wouLd be such that Loan contracts
denominated in nationaL currencies uoutd disappear aLtogether whiLe others
consider that, being excessiveLy costLy for borrowers, fuLI indexation
wouLd prove harmfuL.
In fact, everything hinges on the extent to which the nominaL interest rate
in each country adjusts to the rate of domestic infLation. If  perfect
adjustment took ptace and if  exchange rates, in conformity w'ith PPP, atso
perfectLy mirrored the infLation rate differ.entiaLs  between countries, a
fulLy-indexed  EPC wou[d prove neither more beneficiaL for a Lender nor more
burdensome for a borrower than a security denominated  in nationat currency
and carnying an interest rate that was higher by an amount equal to the rate
of infLation. It  may aLso be added that, in cases where the rate of infLation
cannot be correctLy anticipated, the nominaI interest rate is the sum of
the reaL interest rate, the anticipated rate of infLation and a risk premium.
For instance, a risk-averse borrower wiIL prefer to pay a reaL interest rate
of 4 7. on a Liabi['ity denominated in EPC when the reaL value of his tiabiLity
is assured rather than an interest rate of 16 "A, with a forecasted rate of
inflation of 12 %. This is so because there is atways a risk that the
reaLised rate of inflation wiLL not be 12'1. But the simutations  show that the
average yieLd of the fuLLy-indexed EPC is not very different from the nomina[
interest rate on FF-denominated bonds with a number of sizabte discrepancies
on either side.
The overaLt yield of the semi-indexed  EPC tends to be lower than the nominaL
interest rate in France (atso with some important exceptions).  A fuLLy-indexed
EPC carrying an interest nate of between 2 and 4 % wouLd give a rnuch
higher yieLd than bonds, and this might, for some Lenders, offset the
greater varfabiLity of the yieLd.
.1.115.
It  would appesr, therefore, that tho fearE voiced by thoeo uho sae the
EPC, in either form, as too strong a potentiaL rivaL to the nationaL
currencies are exaggerated. It  wouLd probabLy even be necessary to
subsidize the net"r currency when it  is first  issued by means of an interest
rate payabLe on assets denominated in EPC.
2.2. Competition between the NationaI Currency and the EPC
It  is in this fieLd that competition is LikeLy to be keenest as the
nationaL currency does not, as a generaL rule, carry interest.  In fact,
competitive factors  r"ri LI favour both the EPC and the nationat currency
for the fo[[owing reasons.
- Durings its "running-in" period, the EPC rjLL be handicapped by externaL
factors. As tong as the EpC is used by a smatl number of people,
hotding it  wiLL be costLy due to transaction costs. SubsequentLy there
wil.I be a "snot.lbalt" effect because as the EPC becomes more wide[y used,
it  witt prove more useful and hence wiLL be in greater demand.,Its
progretss at this stage and even the actuaL eLimination of a nationaL
currenrcy coutd then be very rapid.
-Thefactthatdur.ingthe.,running-in,'periodaLtpriceswiLLneedtobe
exprr:ssed both in nationaL currency and in Epc or, at least, that
catcuLations for converting the nationaI currency into EPC wiLL need to
be carried out wiLL be a further obstacLe to the introduction of the EpC.
It  is,  however, conceivabte that traders wiLI graduatty reatize that it
is simpLer to fix prices in Epc as they witL then be in a position to
car'ry out economic caLcuLations in rea[ terms without having to worry
about inflation.  It  witt atso be simpler to convert, where necessary,
pl"ices expressed in EPC into prices expressed in nationaI currency.
Evenwithasemi-indexedEPC,whereitwiLLnotbepossibtetocarryout
r:aLcuIations jn i"eat terrns, the greater stabiLity of this currency may
Lead peopLe to prefer it.
-  Those who fear that the EPC witI supersede too napid[y national currencies
can atso take heart from the follouing argument.
The first  peopLe to use the EPC wiLt probabLy be those ulhose inftationary
expectations are strongest, Noll, at teast in certain cases and in certain116.
countries, the suppLy of money may be highLy elastjc, that is to say
the monetary authorities lliLt be retuctant to combat the repercussions
of infLat'ionary expectations t.lith monetary poLicy measures and wiLL "rat'ify",
as it  91ere/ these infLationary factors. The fact that individuaLs' whose
expectations are the most infLationary, wiLI now seek to hotd EPC and not
nationaL currency wit I ease this pressure on the monetary authorities.
Competition from the EPC may aLso induce the monetary authorities to curb
the rate of growth of the nationaL money stock'
It  is aLso important to emphasize that the EPC invoLves a significant
e[ement of risk sjnce its exchange rate nay tLuctuate in the short and
medium term. The problem woutd appear in a very different Light if  we were
discussing competition between an indexed and a non-indexed  nationaL
currency. It  is obvious that the former wouId immediatety be preferred
by everyone since it  invoLves no information costs and is risk-free.
The same is not true of the EPC. t'lhite the EPC affords a satisfactory
guarantee of constant purchasing power in the "Long term" it  wiLl not
necessariLy do so in the short term. Assume, for exampLe, that a German
has LiabiLities  denominated in DM and assets denominated in EPC. It  may
be that the day he has to honour his tiabiLities the exchange rate of the
DM wiLL be such that he receives fewer DM than he wouLd have done if  he
had stayed in DM. There is tittLe Iikelihood of this happening with
a fulLy-indexed  EPC. However, the vaLue of a EPC in terms, say, of DMs
wiLL occasionaLLy falI  from one month to the next (Annex iII-B).  This
risk is, of course,, much greater in the case of the semi-indexed EPC where
it  woutd perhaps be better for the German to hotd DM rather than EPC
since the risk associated with the EPC would be greater, even though
initiatia[y  both DMs and EPC offer the same protection. Thus, the EPC
nay, for a certain period of time, fol"Low a currency other than the DM
because the infLation rate in the country in question is tower; aLso
the DM value of that currency does not move exactLy in Line with the
short-term purchasing porer parity and because the DM is overvatued
in relation to that currency and hence in relation to the EPC.117.
The point llas atso made eartier that there would be a risk in hoLding
EPC  onty during the period in which use of nationat currencies stitL
oredomi nat ed.
To the extent that the  EP(_ is seen basicatty as a rivaL to the Euro-currencies,
at teast in an initiaL stage, its variabiLity in terms of nationat currency
wouLd probabLy be no greater than is that of the Euro-currencies currentLy in
use.
FinaLLy, if  the intervention ruLe proposed in Chapter II  had been appLied in the
past, exchange-rate  ftuctuations woutd have been very targeLy cushioned, with
the resuLt that the vaLue of the  EPC in terms of nationat curren,cy would have
varied to a much Lesser degree. The ruLe is, therefore, an important adjunct
to the introduction of the EpC.
2-3. Another Strateqy for the _Europeal paraLLeL Cur,rency ?
In spite of the reservations  expressed above, the  EpC is [ikety to be an
extremetycompetitivecurrency,particuLarLyiffuLLyindexed.In0PTIcA'75
Feasons were put forward in favour of attowing the nationaL currencies
to continue in circu[ation and which, in turn, had l.ed to the advocacy of a semi-  I
'  indexed EPc and the incLusion of safeguard cLauses. However, a further
possibiLity might be expLored.
It  is difficu[t to say with any degree of precision how Long it  would take the
EPc'  whether fuLLy-indexed or semi-indexed to achieve fuLL acceptabitity,
since th'is depends on the role pLayed by externat factorsi the rates of 
i
inflation in the different countries; the interest rate paid on securitjes
denominated in  EPc  and the expectations of transactors as to how the value
of the EPc wiLt fLuctuate in terms of their own currency. Consideration 
l
of these various factors leads some peopte to fear - or to hope - that the
EPc  uiIL be introduced speediLy or, on the contrary, slowLy. The
situation in a number of countries seems ctear : the  EPC would probabLy
win prompt acceptance jn the countries with very high rates of infLation
(e.9. 2A D;  what is more, the speed of introduction would probabLy be boosted
by externaI economies. In the countries with a LohJ infLation rate, the EPc
wouLd probabLy  make sLow progress at first,  gathering momentum Later on.
Elsewhere, the course of events fs more difficult  to predict.1 18.
In order to ensure that the EPC is not introduced too rapidty,it  wouLd probabLv
be useful to incorporate into the system arrangements  taking fuLLer account
of poticy desiderata : for instance, the nationaL or Community authorities
might decide that the EPC couLd or must be used for specific types of
transaction. If  a whoLe range of such precautionary measures (or, converse[y,
incentives)  were introduced, there might perhaps be grounds for advocating
a fulty-indexed  EPC as opposed to the semi-indexed  EPC proposed in opTICA'75.
One advantage of this is that creation of the EPC would present "a historic
opportunity". If  a futLy-indexed Epc, which, in our view, is j'ustified for
reasons of effectiveness and eguity, is not adopted now, it  woutd be more
difficutt to introduce it  in the future. steps can, however, be taken to
ensure that a fuL[y-indexed EPC does not force the nationaL currencies out
of circulation too quickty, and the speed of introduction can, in a way,
be managed by the national or Community authorities. Such a strategy  wouLd
be in keeping with the scheme for integration at different speeds.
3. Potentiat Competition between the Euro-doLLar and the EpC
In an attempt to as5ess how far the EPC coutd compete effectiveLy with
the Euro-dolLar, we have traced in Graphs 18 and 19 the three
months yieLd of EPC in terms of Ff and the yietd of a Euro-doLLar investment
covered in terms of FF. The curve representing the EPC (fuLLy-indexed  in
Graph 18, and partiatLy-indexed in Graph 1% r.las caIcuLated on the basis
of the average quarterty vatues of the Epc in FF. The yield, expressed
in annual terms, llas caLcutated by comparing the price of the EpC cluring
a given quarter with its price during the foltowing quarter : for instance,
the yietd indicated in the graphs for any quarter represents the change
in value, in annuat terms, of the FF vatue of the EpC between the quarter
'in question and the fotLowing quarter.
To caIcuLate the yietd of the Euro-doLLar
three-month Euro-doLIar interest rate and
three-month forward exchange rate and the
expressed in annuaL terms.
in FF, we added together the
the difference between the
spot rate.  This yieLd is aLso1i9,
It  can'be seen that the yietd of the fuLty-indexed EPC and that of
the Euro-doltar covered in terms of  fF  are sirni[ar. The yieLd of
the semi-indexed EPC is, of course, [ower than that of the covered Euro-
doLLar rate. The difference  cou[d be offset by the payment of an interest
rate on the EPC.
Here too, the FF vaLr.le of the EPC ft,uctuates more markedLy than
that of the Euro-doLLar. However, if  these resutts are to be correctLy
interpreted, the foItowing points should be borne in mind
- If  the year 1969 and the period covering tate 1973 and earl.y 1974 are
disregarded, the differences in the changes in vatue woutd be much less
substantiaL.  The high yietd o1 16s EPC in the third quarter of 1969
is, of course, attributabLe to the devaLuation of the franc and the sharp
fLuctuations recorded in the second period to the disturbances that
occurred at the ti*" 
(1).
- The yield of the covered Euro-do[lar fs guaranteed, whi[e that of the
EPC  is not.  It  can, however, be reitenated that introduction of the
IPC  wouLcl sureLy entaiL a forward market in this currency and this
tioutd guarantee its yieLd in terms of a nationat currency and wouLd Limit
the extent to which its vatue woutd fLuctuate.
- Fina[ty, Graphs 18 and 19 enab[e us to examine the choices open to a
transactor in Fnance who is seeking the best possibLe combination of yieLd
and risk in terms of his nationat currency. This assumes, therefore, that
his LiabiIities are denominated in nationaL currency. The graphs in questim
do not he[p in deciding whether the EPC is a better instrument for financing
intra-Community  transactions than the Euro-doLLar, in other words whether
it  does, or does not, satisfy a "European  monetary need". Moreover,
as mentioned earLierr the greater variabitity of the EpC compared with
the Euro-dottar rate coutd be seen as signifying a greater variabitity
of the Euro-doLtar in terms of the EPc once the circulation of the Latter
were such that IiabiLities and cLaims were expressed predominantLy in EpC.
(1) The same is true as regards comparison of the Epc and the in FF (section 1).  As stated earIier, the ruLe referred
,  II  woutd, if  applied, have tempered the fLuctuations.
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TECHNICAL  PROBLEf'4S OF SIMULATION
The aim of this Annex is to expLain a number of the technicaL
choices concerning the simutation exercises in Chapter III.
Base oeriod
The base period was choosen on the basis of the avai [ab[e
statisticat series. It  r,ras impossibte to obtain homogeneous series for
al.t the countries before 1963. As a resuLt, the statistics have been
compi led from that year onwards. However, there is no way of being sure
that 1963 was an equ'iLibrium year. So, the average vaLue of each variabLe
from 1963 - 67 was used to determine the weight of each currency necessary
for caLculating the vaLue of the fuLLy indexed EPC. As a resutt, the
starting year for the simuLations is'1967.
lrleight s
The weight g'iven to each currency is proportionaI to the GNP of
the country in question. If  the money suppLy of each country had been used
as the re[evant criterion, the weights wouLd have been much the same. It
wouLd a[so have been possibte to use the European Unit of Account-
To prevent cumulative distortions it  uas decided to adjust the
weights each year. The weights were ca[cutated on the basis of the
average GNP over the preceding five years, with the exchange rates used
for converting the 6NP figures into dotLars being the rates recorded in those
same five years,
Ctear[y, as a resuLt of the weight'ing adjustments, the price of the
EPC changes in January each year for reasons other than price or exchange-rate
movements: th:is changerhohrever, is retativeLy sma[1.. The neights cou[d
have been staggered, but thfs t"rould have further compLicated the computation
and, consequentLy,  increased information costs to potentiat users.
Nen member countries
Different simuLations  couLd conceivab[y be carried out for the period
before December 197? and for the period commencing January 1973. However,123.
if  the EPC were to exist one day, the problem of adjusting the weights wouLd
arise owing to the entry of new members, and a soLution wouLd have
to be found.
The technique we have chosen is simpty to adjust the weights. If
the coefficients a. represent the number of units of currency i  in
the EPC and if  the coefficients6li represent the weights for that currency/
the foLLowing requirements  need to be met. The vaLue of one EPC in terms,
say, of FF in January 1973 must be that catcutated by appLying the EPC
formuta to the five currencies of the "existing" member countries; the
change in the vaLue of the EPC between December 1977 and January 1973
must be deterrnined on the basis of the exchange-rate changes and the
changes in infLation rates between these two dates. Furthermore, we have
redefined the EPC in such a t"lay that one new unit equals one oLd unft.
The new coefficients, al  andC{r,; theo(r. represent the structure (and -  'r  1-  1
not the dimension) of the EPC and are caLcuLated  on the basis of the
criterion specified above (dottar GNP). The dimension factor is
determined by the fact that one new unit of the EPC equals one oLd unit,
and this enables ar., to be calculated (given the exchange rates beth/een
the new currencies and one of the currencies constituting the old EPC).
0ther information
The exchange rate of the FF is  calcutated  on the basis of the
average monthLy rates quoted in paris.121.
ANNEX LII.q
INFLUENC[  0F TiJE irnTE','JHEN  THE Il'lDIr,i:i T0 CALCULATE THE EPC
ARE RECORDED
v  l-et us assune that the price indices are published on the tenth day of
every month, with a time-Lag of forty days (e.9. indices reteased on 10 March
r  r€late to January). It  is sometimes  argued that everyone wiLl convert his
cash batances into  EPC on the ninth of the month, certain in the knowLedge
that he uitI  make a profit by resetLing the  EPC on the eteventh, provided
that the  EPc is not yet in sufficiently wide circuLation for him to wish to
hold on to his  EPC .  This would be one way of shifting the burden of the in-
fLation iltax'r onto the centraI banks without this encouraging wider use of the
EpCi  the opposite of what is desired. However, for such a transaction to be
worthwhite, the anticipated  gain must exceed the transaction costs and, what
i s more, the potentiaI ri sk must not invotve a subjective cost outh,e'ighing thi s
gain.
TabLes IiI-€.-1 ancj IIi-B-2 *row that the rnonth-on-month  jncrease in the vaLue of
the FCin terms of  DM is generatty tess than 1 Z (the maximum increases re-
corded being 3.48 %r 2.33 % and 1.98 %> and that, in a number of cases, its vatue 
i
felL (the maximum figures recorded being - 5.18'1, - 2.94'l and -  2.25 7(r.
The monthty changes in the va[ue of the EPc  when converted into FF"
were naturaLty more marked, atthough negative figures were stiLL recorded.
It  is difficuLt to assess transaction costs and the risk invoLved,
If,  however, there seemed to be some etement of risk in the temporary conversion  ,
of nationaL currencies into  EPC, on the eve of the adjustment of the value of
the EPC one of the foltowfng steps coutd be taken :  ,
-  spread the change in the vaLue of the  EPC over an entire month,in
other words, atter the vatue of the EPc daily, from one caLcutation
date to the next
-  fix a margin of fluctuation af, say, + O.5 /, :  a transactor in the
Cornmunity  wouLd then exchange EPCs against the nationat currencies
on[y if  the market price touched its  ceiIing or ftoor.125.
TABLE III-B-f
changes in the vaLue of the Europa in terms of FF (as Z)
(Consumer prices)
1967
I 968
1 9C9
1 970
1971
197?
1971
a t\.,  A
1975
197'o
Mont h-on-mont  h
o. go
1 ,08
o.?0
1 .07
0.0
0.7"t
0.10
o.42
*
2./,4^
0.52
0.81
* 5.18
1 .98
0.94
0.81
0.20
0,10
0.20
0.20
0.20
0.60
2.25
0.54
0.'52
0.32
o.63
4.1'5
0.6?.
0.21
a.?3
0.0
1,62
0.98
l'01
0.40
0.10
0.J0
0.20
0.40
1 .24
o.52
o.r2
4,74
0.21
0,5'J
1.03
1 .60
0.4 6
0,56
, 1.91
I .51
0.50'
0.60
0. J0
- 0.20
0.9?
0.10
_ ?-.94
_ o.7?
0.42
0.6]
0.21
0.42
, o.72
0.65
1.02
c,1 '!
_ 0.]1
2rr3
- 0.20
)
0.19
0.10
a.t0
0.20
0.40
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0,61
1 .04
0.5J
Lr. / 'i
0.5'l
0.54
3.48
0.5fi
4.42
1.3'
1.49
u.:)\,
c.1l
0.,1{.'
v.r,:
f,  )n
0..r,)
c'.52
0.1.2
0.,:;i
oa'
nc:
0.61
o.?9
Change on November126'.
TABLE III-B-Z
Month-on-month  changes in the vaLue
of Dwt (as Z)
Consumer pri ces)
of the Europa in terms
I
1967
19(i3
195!'
1 970
197t
1977
197':,
t9i4
1975
1976
1 .17
0.99
0.12
0.88
0.01
o.3B
0.10
O,rs'l
0.76
0.96^
0.61
0.77
'J,41
.l .zt
1.97
Q.g2
0.86
1.J8
0.1 1
-  0.?.3
- 0.20
0.09
0.29
5.78
o,3'i
o.56
0.4 6
1 .?"8
A  art \/r  |  |
-  0.1/;
-  0.51
o' 57
41 1Q
- o.77
0.58
0;2?
o,46
0.15
0.02
0.75
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2.8?
0.69
Q.31
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1 ,57
0.10
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-  O,6'i '  0.6s|
l.){i
o.Bl
0.10
1.1?
0.4 g
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1.1'l
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0.Bri
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